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Jeong Hwan Lee
This dissertation consists of three essays on corporate nance. In the rst chapter, I
investigate how a liquidity cost associated with debt- debt servicing costa¤ects a rms
capital structure policy. In contrast to the standard capital structure theory prediction that
builds on a trade-o¤between interest tax shields and expected bankruptcy costs, public rms
use debt quite conservatively. To address this well known debt conservatism puzzle (Graham
2000), I argue that servicing debt drains valuable liquidity for a nancially constrained rm
and hence endogenously creates debt servicing costs,which have received little attention in
the literature. To examine the inuence of debt servicing costs on capital structure choices,
I develop and estimate a dynamic corporate nance model with interest tax shields, liquidity
management, investment, external debt and equity nancing costs, and capital adjustment
costs. By using the marginal value of liquidity as a natural measure of the debt servicing
costs, I nd that (1) an increase in nancial leverage results in higher debt servicing costs,
even with risk-free debt. (2) a smaller rm tends to experience greater debt servicing costs
because of its endogenously large investment demands; and (3) in the majority of cases,
equity proceeds are used for cash retention as well as capital expenditure, especially when
a rm faces large current and future investment needs. In addition, I quantitatively show
that large debt servicing costs are closely associated with low leverage and frequent equity
nancing by analyzing the role of xed operating costs and convex capital adjustment costs.
In the second chapter, I empirically support the theoretical debt servicing costs analysis
of the previous chapter. I rstly examine the structural estimation method used for the cal-
ibration of my model in the rst chapter. The statistical property of the simulated method
of moments estimator and detailed identication scheme for the calibration are investigated
in the rst half of this chapter. Then I cross-sectionally conrm the validity of debt ser-
vicing costs predictions on capital structure choices. I study how each rms convex capital
adjustment costs, operating leverage, prot volatility, and future investment needs inuence
capital structure policies. Consistent with the debt servicing costs predictions, rms with
higher convex capital adjustment costs, higher operating leverage, higher prot volatility
and larger future investment demands show lower leverage ratios and more frequent equity
nancing activities. These ndings shed new lights on pervasively conservative debt policy in
U.S. public rms. A higher protability observed in large future investment demands rms
also suggests the importance of debt servicing costs consideration in resolving the puzzling
negative correlation between protability and leverage ratios.
In the third chapter, I examine how macroeconomic conditions a¤ect the cyclical varia-
tions in capital structure policies. As in the nancial crisis of 2008, economic contractions
a¤ect a rms protability, investments and external nancing conditions altogether. To
address the e¤ects of these simultaneous changes on capital structure dynamics, I develop
and estimate a dynamic trade-o¤ model with investment, payouts, and liquidity policies
with macroeconomic protability and nancing shocks. Investment dynamics and a higher
value of liquidity of economic downturn are pivotal in capital structure dynamics; the former
drives the issuance of debt and equity, and the latter leads to active debt retirements and
conservative debt issues in upturns. My model yields the following main results: (1) Equity
issues are pro-cyclical, and concentrated for small, low prot, and large investment demand
rms in earlier stage of economic upturns. (2) Payouts peak in later stages of upturns and
co-move positively with equity issues; (3) Debt policies move counter-cyclically, and leverage
ratios after debt issuance and retirement are even higher during economic downturns. My
comparative static analysis predicts pro-cyclical debt policy for nancially constrained rms,
and pervasively conservative use of debt for rms expecting nancial market shutdowns.
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Chapter 1
Debt Servicing Costs and Capital Structure
1.1 Introduction
Graham (2000) documents that public rms tend to forgo potentially large tax shields and
that this tendency is paradoxically more signicant for the rms with low nancial distress
costs. These ndings pose strong challenges to the standard capital structure theory that
builds on a trade-o¤ between interest tax shields and expected bankruptcy costs (Modigliani
and Miller 1958). Graham (2000) concludes that public rms are leaving a signicant sum
of money on the table by remaining underlevered.
To address this debt conservatism puzzle, I argue that servicing debt drains valuable
liquidity for a nancially constrained rm and thus endogenously creates debt servicing
costs. A rm retains cash to avoid costly external nancing but servicing debt obligations
depletes such valuable cash holding. When a rm faces a highly valuable liquidity from
large acquisition plans or poor business performance, large debt servicing costs may lead to
the rms conservative debt policy even with a negligible likelihood of nancial distress. As
servicing debt drains a rms valuable cash, the debt servicing cost is naturally measured
by the marginal value of liquidity, which is also a critical determinant of a rms net payout
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and liquidity policies (Bolton, Chen, and Wang 2011, hereafter BCW).
I develop and estimate a dynamic capital structure model with precautionary liquidity
holding to examine how debt servicing costs a¤ect a rms capital structure choice. A rm
makes investment, cash retention, capital structure, and payout decisions by considering
interest tax shields, external nancing costs and capital adjustment costs. Debt and equity
nancing costs are pivotal elements underlying a rms precautionary cash saving incentives
(BCW). Capital adjustment costs shape intertemporal investment demands and determine
the cost of asset sales (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited 2011, hereafter DDW). An endoge-
nous investment decision crucially inuences the value of liquidity, as it utilizes currently
accumulated cash stocks.
My model analysis on the relationship between debt servicing costs and a rms leverage,
protability shock, and capital stock yields a number of interesting results. Most notably,
a rm with large debt obligations faces higher debt servicing costs, even with risk-free debt
issuance. To pay down large debt obligations, a rm with limited liquidity holding tends to
rely more heavily on capital resale and external nancing, both of which involve increasing
marginal costs. Current asset sales also incur additional future prot losses by reducing a
rms prot generation capacity. The increase in debt servicing costs reects explicit costs
and ine¢ ciency from asset sales and external nancing.
This rise in debt servicing costs is closely associated with the debt conservatism puzzle
(Graham 2000). Most of all, this nding provides an economic ground for a rms conserva-
tive use of debt even in the face of large unused tax benets and low nancial distress costs.
Economic factors closely associated with conservative debt policy also reinforce the potential
importance of debt servicing costs in resolving the debt conservatism puzzle; future growth
options to fund, large acquisition plans, asset intangibility, and excess cash holding are all
closely connected with a large marginal value of liquidity.
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Next, a rm with low protability shocks tends to experience large debt servicing costs.
A currently low operating prot realization directly indicates low internal funds to service
debt obligations, given a limited amount of cash holding. It further predicts low expected
future prots due to the positive serial correlations in a rms operating prots. Both forces
increase a rms marginal value of liquidity considerably; indeed, they do so in spite of
currently small investment demands implied by the low protability shock realization.
Moreover, a rm with low capital stocks confronts large debt servicing costs. A smaller
rm must investment more in the current and future periods, due to a decreasing returns
to scale prot technology. Such additional funding demands for capital expenditures raise
the marginal value of liquidity, which potentially leads to lower leverage ratios in smaller
rms. Consistent with this debt servicing costs prediction, small rms tend to show lower
leverage ratios (Frank and Goyal 2003; 2008) and large rms rely more heavily on debt
issuance (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999). The marginal value of liquidity directly connects
large investments in smaller rms with low leverage, even without limited debt capacity
considerations as in DDW.
I shall now turn to my model simulation results. Most remarkably, equity proceeds, in the
majority of cases, are used for cash retention as well as capital expenditure, especially when
a rm faces large current and future investments. While large future investment demands
imply highly valuable liquidity for a rm, the rm has to use a considerable amount of cash
stocks for currently vast investments. To stockpile a substantial amount of cash stocks, the
rm not only uses its operating prots, but also relies on equity nancing that does not drain
valuable liquidity in the future. Consistent with this nding, equity proceeds are primarily
used for near term cash saving (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 2010) and equity nancing is
concurrent with large current and future investments (Loughran and Ritter 1997; Fama and
French 2002). Unlike prior security issuance theories highlighting the use of equity proceeds
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for debt payments (Strebulaev 2007) or large asymmetric information costs of equity issuance
(Myers and Majluf 1984), the model simulation results emphasize the use of equity proceeds
for cash retention.
The model simulations for di¤erent levels of xed operating costs and convex capital
adjustment costs demonstrate that large debt servicing costs are closely associated with
low leverage and frequent equity nancing. An increase in xed operating costs lowers a
rms protability, but it does not change investment demands signicantly. Given a similar
investment needs, a rm with lower prots tends to experience a higher marginal value of
liquidity. An increase in convex capital adjustment costs is also closely related to large debt
servicing costs because it raises the cost of asset sales. In both xed operating costs and
convex capital adjustment costs simulations, rms with large debt servicing costs tend to
maintain lower leverage and issue equity more frequently.
These quantitative predictions are in line with prior empirical studies. Kahl, Lunn, and
Nilsson (2012) nd that higher operating leverage rms tend to use less debt and collect
large amounts of equity proceeds, consistent with the xed operating costs analysis. R&D
expenditures are closely associated with large convex capital adjustment costs and R&D
intensive rms are well known for their low leverage and frequent equity nancing (Hall
2002), as predicted in the quantitative analysis on convex capital adjustment costs.
In summary, this chapter investigates the interdependence between liquidity policy and
capital structure choices, which is a key missing link in existing literature. The standard
trade-o¤ theory (Modigliani and Miller 1958) balances the value of tax shields against nan-
cial distress costs without liquidity considerations. BCW and Riddick and Whited (2009)
highlight the interaction between external equity nancing and liquidity management policy
but ignore the role of debt nancing. Recent dynamic trade-o¤ models with endogenous
investments (DDW; Hennessy and Whited 2005; 2007) primarily focus on debt dynamics
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and pay little attention to liquidity and equity nancing policy. Gamba and Triantis (2008)
emphasize the relationship between the value of liquidity and economic conditions such as
tax environments and external nancing costs. Yet, the link between liquidity value and
capital structure choice is largely unexamined in their analysis.
The next section introduces the baseline model in detail. Section 3 calibrates the model
and analyzes debt servicing costs and equity nancing policy implications from the baseline
model. Section 4 reports the comparative static analysis results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Model
Amanager decides the representative rms investment and nancing policies for each period
to maximize the discounted value of future net dividends stream. Her choice set consists
of liquidity management, debt and equity nancing, real investment, and dividends payout
decisions to shareholders.
1.2.1 Prots and Investment
The rms prot function, (k; z); depends on capital stock, k, protability shock, z; and
xed operating cost, f . I choose a standard functional form for (k; z):
(k; z) = zk   f (1.1)
where  captures the returns to scale of the prot function. The protability shock, z;
follows an AR(1) process in logs:
log z0 =  log z + " (1.2)
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in which " has normal distribution with mean zero and variance 2. All primed variables
indicate next period ones.
Investment, I, is dened as the di¤erence between next period capital stock and current
capital stock after depreciation:
I = k0   (1  )k; (1.3)
in which  is the depreciation rate of capital stock.
The installation and resale of capital stock incur organizational adjustment costs, Gk(k; I); that
are given by




where 1I 6=0 is an indicator function, the value of which is equal to one if investment is
nonzero, and zero otherwise. This functional formulation includes both xed and convex
capital adjustment costs, which is a standard one in empirical literature. The xed cost is
proportional to the level of current capital stock, k and a large xed cost parameter k implies
more lumpy investment. The convex cost is a quadratic function of investment, I and a large
convex cost parameter k indicates smoother investment demands and high capital resale
costs. See Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and DDW for more detailed discussion for this
formulation.
1.2.2 Liquidity and Debt
A state variable, c; represents the rms cash holding at the end of the previous period. Cash
stocks earn interests at the risk-free rate, r, and current liquidity holding is the sum of the
previous period cash holding and its interest earnings, c(1 + r). Carrying cash stock does
not involve any other explicit costs.
The manager issues a one period bond that pays interests at the same risk-free rate, r.
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The current period principal payment is denoted as b. I introduce a collateral constraint to
ensure the risk-free return to creditors:
b0(1 + r)  c0(1 + r) + (1  ) k0 + (k0; zmin)  Tax(zmin; k0; b0; c0); (1.5)
where zmin is the lower bound for the protability shock. The next period debt obligations
must be smaller than the sum of liquidity holding, capital stock after depreciation, and
minimum after-tax prots in the next period.
Debt issuance involves nancing cost that is modeled as a piecewise linear function:
Gb(b
0
; b) =  bb0 + b (b0   b) 1(b0 b)>0; (1.6)
in which 1(b0 b)>0 equals one if current period net debt issuance, b0   b, is positive, and
zero otherwise. The rst component is proportional to current period debt issuance, b0,and
 b represents the baseline debt nancing cost for all debt proceeds. The second term captures
additional debt nancing costs when a rm increases its net debt obligations (b0 > b) and
b represents the increment of marginal debt nancing cost. This cost function reects
the convexity in debt nancing costs (Altinkihc and Hansen 2000; Leary and Roberts 2005).
Consistent with recent ndings in Denis and McKeon (2012), a rms considerable increase in
debt obligations is concurrent with large investments and its deleveraging process is relatively
slow under this debt nancing cost structure. See Gamba and Triantis (2008) for detailed
discussion about this functional formulation.
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1.2.3 Tax, Payout, and Valuation
The rms earnings before taxes (EBT), g; are equal to the sum of the rms operating prots
and interest earnings less depreciation and interest expenses:
g = (k; z)  k   r(b  c): (1.7)
The marginal tax rate depends on the sign of EBT. The tax rate for positive EBT, +c ,
exceeds the tax rate for negative EBT,  c : The positive tax rate for negative EBT is
considered as a rebate provided by the government. Accordingly, the rms tax bill is
Tax = +c g1g0    c g(1  1g0); (1.8)
where 1g0 is an indicator function that takes one if the rms EBT are positive, and zero
otherwise. This corporate taxation environment is identical to that of Hennessy and Whited
(2007).
The managers payout before equity nancing cost, e, is the sum of current prots and
net debt issuance less net debt payout, investment, tax bill, capital adjustment costs, and
debt nancing costs. Thus e can be summarized by the following equation:
e(z; k; b; c) = (k; z) + (b0   c0)  (b  c) (1 + r)  I   Tax Gb(b0; b) Gk(k; I): (1.9)
External equity nancing, e < 0; incurs otation costs, Ge(e; k): The cost function is modeled







where 1e<0 is an indicator function that is equal to one if the rm issues equity, and zero
otherwise. Empirical studies such as Altinkihc and Hansen (2000) and Leary and Roberts
(2005) conrm the importance of both cost components in explaining public rmsequity
issuance activities. Similar to BCW, the xed cost depends on a rms prot generation
capacity, k, and e governs the size of xed equity nancing costs. The second term
captures the importance of quadratic costs and " controls the curvature of the cost function.
Hennessy and Whited (2007) and Riddick and Whited (2009) use the same formulation for
convex equity nancing costs.
The net payout to shareholders, d, is given by:
d(z; k; b; c) = (1 Ge(e; k)1e<0)e; (1.11)
in which 1e<0 is an indicator function that assumes the value one if the rm issues equity
and zero otherwise. The shareholders do not pay the tax on dividends income in accordance
with DDW.
The manager maximizes the discounted value of net payouts to shareholders. The dis-
count rate for the shareholders takes account of the interest income tax and I assume a at












The Bellman equation for the rms equity value is
V (z; k; b; c) = max
k0;b0;c0
d(z; k; b; c; k0; b0; c0) +
1
1 + r(1   i)
EV (z
0
; k0; b0; c0); (1.13)
where the rms optimal policy is subjected to the collateral constraint (1.5). See Hennessy
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and Whited (2005) for the contraction mapping property of this Bellman equation.
The model includes the following elements: interest tax shields, liquidity management,
endogenous investments, persistency in the protability shock evolution, capital adjustment
costs, and external nancing costs. Among of the models features, one period maturity and
the following debt nancing cost structure are the key elements. Prior models largely ignore
debt nancing costs (e.g. DDW) or set the maturity structure as innity (e.g. Gamba and
Triantis 2008), even though they share similar tax benets, prot generation processes, and
capital adjustment costs. Without debt nancing costs, a rm almost freely rolls over its debt
obligations and hence confronts insignicant servicing costs of debt. With the perpetuity
maturity structure, a rm may be able to delay the payment of principals indenitely, which
also leads to very low debt servicing costs. A deliberately chosen one period debt structure
highlights the importance of debt servicing costs in the model analysis.
1.3 Quantitative Analysis
1.3.1 Calibration
To investigate quantitative implications of the model precisely, I choose the baseline parame-
ters via the simulated method of moments (SMM) by following DDW. The SMM estimation
nds a set of structural parameters driving the moments of articially simulated data from
the model as close as possible to the corresponding empirical moments. This estimation
procedure helps ensure tight connections between the models quantitative predictions and
a rms nancing and investment policy in the real world.
To gain e¢ ciency in the structural estimation procedure, I rst parameterize the xed
operating cost as follows:
f = kss;
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where kss indicates the steady state level of capital stock.  governs the size of the xed
operating costs.
I also x a group of structural parameters at economically reasonable levels to improve the
e¢ ciency of the estimation procedure. The tax rate for positive taxable corporate income, +c ;
is set to 0.35, which is the maximum of corporate tax rate during the sample period. DDW
use the same value for their corporate tax rate. The tax rate for negative taxable income,  c ;
is xed at 0.09 reecting the e¤ective tax rate on negative EBT from the taxation function
of Hennessy and Whited (2005). The depreciation rate,  is 0.12 similar to Hennessy and
Whited (2005) and DDW. The risk free interest rate, r; is 0.025 and the interest income tax,
 i, is 0.25, consistent with Hennessy and Whited (2005).
The following parameters are estimated via the SMM procedure: the uncertainty ; and
serial correlation ; of the protability shock; the prot function curvature ; the xed capital
adjustment cost k and convex capital adjustment cost k; the xed equity nancing cost e
and convex equity nancing cost e; the baseline debt nancing cost  b and the additional
debt nancing cost b; and the xed operating cost parameter :
Table 1.1 reports the selected moments variables for the identication of the model. The
table also documents the empirical moments based on CRSP/Compustat merged database
from 1988 to 2010 and the simulated moments from the model at the baseline SMM estimates.
These moments consist of the rst and second moments of investment, operating prots,
leverage and cash holding. The average of dividends and equity nancing, the autocorrelation
of operating prots, equity nancing frequency and the Tobins q values are also included.
This moment selection is closely related to the identication strategy of DDW. The next
chapter includes detailed information about the models identication, and SMM procedure.
Table 1.2 reports the baseline economic parameters estimated via the SMM procedure.
The estimation results are consistent with the prior estimates. The persistency parameter
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Table 1.1: Moments Selection: Acutal and Simulated Values
Variables Actual Moments Simulated Moments
Avg. Investment(I=k) 0.1341 0.1314
Avg. Leverage(b=k) 0.2251 0.2267
Avg. Tobins q(V + b  c)=k) 1.7013 1.7095
Avg. Prot (=k) 0.1731 0.1741
Equity Issuance Freq. (d < 0) 0.1072 0.1017
Avg. Equity Financing( d=k; d < 0) 0.0597 0.0554
Avg. Dividends (d=k; d > 0) 0.0374 0.0323
Var. Investment(I=k) 0.0225 0.0239
Var. Prot (=k) 0.0045 0.0037
SerialCor. Prot (=k) 0.6315 0.6327
Var. Leverage(b=k) 0.0124 0.0149
Avg. Cash Holding (c=k) 0.1150 0.1144
Var. Cash Holding (c=k) 0.0170 0.0163
The actual moments calculations are based on a sample of non nancial, unreg-
ulated rms from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database. The sample period is
19882010. The simulated moments are from the baseline model simulation eval-
uated at the SMM estimates. All moment variables are self-explanatory and the
construction of empirical moments is described in Appendix A.
 is 0.6718, the uncertainty parameter  is 0.1995, and the returns to scale parameter  is
0.7435, all of which are in line with DDW and Hennessy andWhited (2005). The xed capital
adjustment cost parameter k is 0.0090 and the convex capital adjustment cost k is 0.1163.
Both parameters estimates are within economically reasonable ranges, consistent with DDW,
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), and Whited (1992). The convex equity nancing cost e is
0.0003, similar to the estimate of Hennessy and Whited (2007). The baseline debt issuance
cost  b is 0.11% for all proceeds. The maximum debt nancing cost
 
 b + b

is 0.82% of
debt proceeds, lower than average debt issuance cost in Altinkihc and Hansen (2000).
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Table 1.2: Structural Parameter Estimation Results
   k k e e  b b  J-test (p-value)
0.6718 0.1995 0.7435 0.0090 0.1163 0.0045 0.0003 0.0011 0.0071 0.0251 0.2712
This table reports the estimated structural parameters and the result of over-identication test. The value
 and  are the persistency and uncertainty of the protability shock process (log z).  is the curvature of
prot function. k and k are the xed and convex capital adjustment costs. e and e govern the xed and
convex equity nancing cost.  b1 is the baseline debt nancing cost and  
b
2 captures the increase in marginal
debt nancing cost when the rms net debt issuance is positive.  is the xed operating cost parameter
proportional to the steady state state capital stock kss. The J-test is the 2 test for the over-identifying
restrictions of the model. Its p-value is reported.
1.3.2 Growing Debt Obligations: Investment and Financing Poli-
cies
This section investigates how a rm changes investment and nancing policies to service
growing debt obligations.
Figure 1.1 plots the representative rms investment and nancing policies at the steady
level of capital stock (kss) with a low protability shock realization (z = 0:3). A low prof-
itability state limits available internal funds to service debt payments, which provides an
ideal environment to depict a rms investment and nancing policy variations in response
to an increase in debt obligations. I investigate low (c=k = 0:0) and high (c=k = 0:30)
liquidity holding states to highlight the role of limited cash stocks. The graphs are plotted
along with current debt obligations (b=k) and all variables are normalized by the current
capital stock (k):
Panel A shows the e¤ect of growing debt obligations on a rms investment policy. Most
apparently, a greater amount of debt obligations drives additional asset sales for both liq-
uidity holding states. For instance, the rm with high liquidity holding initially sells 26%
of its current capital stock and increase its capital resale to 30% when its leverage ratio is
higher than 0.3. Interestingly, the rm with low liquidity holding always sells a greater or
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Figure 1.1: Growing Debt Obligations: Investment and Financing Policies



















































Financing and investment policy functions are plotted at the steady state capital stock (kss) and a low
protability shock (z = 0:3). Investment policy, net debt policy, net payout policy and net liquidity policy
are illustrated along with the leverage ratio variation in Panels A, B, C, and D respectively.
equal amount of capital stocks than its high liquidity counterpart does. The size of capital
resale is initially the same for both low and high cash holding states (26% of the current
capital stock) but the low liquidity rm begins to sell 30% of the capital stock when the
leverage ratio reaches to 0.05. Although both rms sell the same amount of capital stocks
with the leverage ratio ranging from 0.25 to 0.5, the rm with low cash holding increases
capital resale again when its leverage ratio is larger than 0.5.
Panel B illustrates how a rms nancial leverage a¤ects its net debt retirement policy
(b b0). While both high and low liquidity holding rms try to retire debt for all levels of debt
outstanding, the gure clearly indicates that a low liquidity holding rm retires less debt
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than its high liquidity holding counterpart. For example, the rm with high liquidity holding
discharges all debt obligations when its leverage ratio is 0.2. Yet, the net debt retirement
by the low liquidity holding rm is 12% of the capital stock or only 60% of current debt
obligations, given the same leverage ratio of 0.2. In fact, the high liquidity holding rm
always retires debt to a greater extent when the leverage ratio is higher than 0.12.
Panel C depicts the relationship between the amount of debt obligations and a rms net
payout policy (d). The gure demonstrates that large debt obligations decrease a rms net
payout to shareholders and eventually lead to equity nancing (d < 0) for both high and
low liquidity holding rms. Noticeably, the high liquidity holding rm begins to its equity
issuance at a higher leverage ratio than the low liquidity holding rm does. The rm with
high liquidity holding gradually reduces its dividends payout to zero and sustains its zero
payout until the leverage ratio reaches to 0.8. Then the rm begins to use equity nancing
and increases the amount of equity proceeds afterwards. The low liquidity holding rm
maintains zero dividends payout but begins to issue equity when the rms leverage ratio
becomes 0.43.
Panel D describes net cash holding policy (c0   c) variations in responses to a rms
growing debt obligations. The net cash holding policy of the high liquidity holding rm
is remarkable. The rm initially tries to accumulate additional cash stocks (c0   c > 0),
but then begins to liquidate current cash to service growing debt obligations (c0   c < 0).
Eventually, the rm uses up all of its current cash stock, when the leverage reaches to 0.9.
Similarly, the rm with zero liquidity holding initially stockpiles its cash balance but ceases
its cash stock accumulation, when the leverage ratio becomes 0.5.
Panel D highlights a key aspect of debt servicing costs: servicing debt drains a rms
valuable liquidity. The high liquidity holding rm initially accumulates cash inventory to
the future by selling its capital stock, which implies a large value of liquidity given the level
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of capital and protability shock. Nevertheless, the rm utilizes its cash holding to service
growing debt obligations and eventually uses up all of current cash stocks.
Panels A, B, and C illustrate a rms investment and external nancing policy variations
according to its current debt outstanding and liquidity holding. Given the same amount of
liquidity holding, a rm with large debt obligations sells a greater amount of capital stock
and uses external nancing to a larger extent. Both high and low liquidity rms tend to
increase the amount of asset sales and collect additional equity proceeds to pay down large
debt obligations (Panels A and C). Similarly, given the same amount of debt obligations, a
rm with low liquidity holding relies more heavily on capital resale and external nancing.
The low liquidity rm initiates its equity nancing at a lower leverage, retires less debt, and
sells a greater amount of capital stock than the high liquidity holding rm does (Panels A,
B, and C).
In sum, servicing large debt obligations leads to additional reductions in a rms valuable
cash stocks. A rm with more limited cash holding or with larger debt obligations tends to
rely more heavily on costly capital resale or external nancing to service debt obligations,
which potentially increases debt servicing costs.
1.3.3 Debt Servicing Costs
This section studies the e¤ect of debt obligations, protability shocks, and the levels of capital
stock on debt servicing costs. I use the marginal value of liquidity as a natural measure of
debt servicing costs, as this formulation represents a rms equity value change from an
additional $1 of cash stock. The marginal value of liquidity, given a state of protability,
capital stock, debt obligation and liquidity holding (z; k; b; c); is dened as follows:
Marginal Value of Liquidity =
@
@c
V (z; k; b; c): (1.14)
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Figure 1.2: Marginal Value of Liquidity













The marginal value of liquidity is plotted at the steady state level of capital stock (kss) with a neutral
protability shock (z = 1). The values from two di¤erent levels of cash holding states (c=k = 0; 0:3) are
depicted along with the leverage ratio variation.
BCW emphasize the marginal value of liquidity as a critical determinant of a rms dividends,
equity nancing and liquidity policy. The marginal value of liquidity is a nexus controlling a
rms overall internal and external nancing policies, considering all of its close connections
to debt servicing costs, equity nancing, dividends payout, and cash retention policy.
Figure 1.2 depicts the e¤ect of the leverage variation on the marginal value of liquidity
at the steady state level of capital stock (kss), and a neutral protability shock realization
(z = 1). I plot the marginal value of liquidity for high (c=k = 0:3) and low (c=k = 0) liquidity
states to check the robustness of qualitative predictions.
Most remarkably, Figure 1.2 points out that a rm with larger debt obligations faces
higher debt servicing costs, measured by the marginal value of liquidity. With no liquidity
holding, the marginal value of liquidity begins at 1 but increases to 1.025, when the leverage
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ratio increases from 0 to 0.9. Considering the low risk free rate, 2.5%, of this model, the
increase of 2.5% in the marginal value of liquidity is quite material. For the high liquidity
holding rm, similarly, the marginal value of liquidity initially stays at 0 but begins to
escalate when the leverage ratio grows above 0.4.
The rising debt servicing costs are closely associated with costly capital resale and exter-
nal nancing. With limited cash holding, a rm tends to rely more heavily on capital resale
and external nancing to service larger debt obligations, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Both
capital resale and external nancing involve increasing marginal costs, which directly raise
the marginal value of liquidity. Moreover, capital resale incurs a loss in the future prot
generation capacity and current debt roll-over leads to future debt servicing costs, both of
which drive additional ine¢ ciency. The increase in marginal value of liquidity reects explicit
funding costs and ine¢ ciency from asset sales and external nancing.
This rising marginal value of liquidity sheds new lights on the debt conservatism puzzle
(Graham 2000). Crucially, this nding provides an economic ground for prevailing conser-
vative debt policy. To avoid higher servicing costs from large debt obligations, a rm may
exercise conservative debt policy even with large tax benets and low nancial distress costs.
Economic factors associated with conservative debt policy, such as growth options to nance,
large future acquisition plan, asset intangibility and excess cash holding, all argue for the
signicance of debt servicing costs in resolving the debt conservatism puzzle. Growth options
to fund and a large scale investment plan indicate large funding demands in the future, which
increases a rms precautionary value of liquidity. Asset intangibility is closely related to
higher costs of asset sales, which may lead to large costs in servicing debt payments. Excess
cash holding with conservative debt policy potentially stems from a rms optimal decision
in the face of a large value of liquidity. All of these factors are closely related to large debt
servicing costs.
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Figure 1.3: Marginal Value of Liquidity: Capital Stocks











Marginal Value of Liquidity: Capital Stocks
Leverage, b/k
k = 0.5k ss
k = k ss
The marginal value of liquidity is plotted at a neutral protability shock (z = 1) with zero liquidity holding
(c=k = 0). The liquidity values for the steady state level of capital stock (kss) and a half of the steady state
capital stock (0:5kss) are depicted along with the leverage ratio variation.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the e¤ect of rm size on debt servicing costs. The gure plots the
marginal value of liquidity along with the leverage variation for two di¤erent levels of capital
stock, 0.5kss and kss. All values are evaluated at a neutral protability shock (z = 1) with
no liquidity holding state (c=k = 0).
Figure 1.3 clearly indicates that a low capital stock rm faces higher debt servicing costs,
captured by the marginal value of liquidity. Compared to the rm with the steady state
level of capital stock, the low capital stock rm has a higher value of liquidity for all levels
of debt obligations, and its liquidity value arises more steeply in response to growing debt
obligations. For instance, the marginal value of liquidity is initially 1.001 but arises to 1.04
for the rm with low capital stock, as the leverage ratio varies from 0 to 0.9. With the same
leverage ratio variation, the marginal value of liquidity increases from 1 to 1.025 for the rm
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with the steady state level of capital stock.
Large current and future investments drive such a large marginal value of liquidity in
the low capital stock rm. Due to a decreasing returns to scale prot technology, the low
capital stock rm tends to invest more in the current and future periods, and has to create
more funds for capital expenditures. Such large funding demands raise the marginal value of
liquidity more substantially for the rm with low capital stock, given the same protability
and liquidity holding state.
Empirically, large debt servicing costs in the low capital stock rm predict lower leverage
ratios in small rms. Prior empirical results support the debt servicing cost prediction
between the rm size and debt policy as well as the validity of decreasing returns to scale
prot technology. Smaller rms indeed grow faster than large size rms (Hall 1987), which
seems to a¢ rm the validity of the decreasing returns to scale prot technology. The book
asset size of rm is positively correlated with leverage ratio for a number of di¤erent cross-
sectional models (Frank and Goyal 2008). Small growth rms tend to maintain low leverage
(Frank and Goyal 2003) and large cash ow rich rms heavily rely on debt nancing (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers 1999), consistent with the debt servicing cost prediction.
The marginal value of liquidity directly connects large investments in smaller rms with
low leverage, which di¤ers markedly from the existing literature such as Titman (1988) and
DDW. Titman (1988) emphasizes low nancing costs or low bankruptcy costs in large rms to
explain the relationship between rm size and debt policy. DDW highlight the importance of
intertemporal allocation of limited debt capacity in the link between large future investments
and a currently low leverage ratio.
Figure 1.4 investigates how a rms protability shock a¤ects debt servicing costs. The
gure plots the marginal value of liquidity as a function of leverage ratio for two di¤erent
protability shock scenarios, a low protability shock, z = 0:3 and a neutral protability
20
Figure 1.4: Marginal Value of Liquidity: Protability Shocks










Marginal Value of Liquidity: Profitability Shocks
z = 0.3
z = 1
The marginal value of liquidity for two di¤erent states of the protability shock (z = 0:3; 1) are plotted
along with the leverage ratio variation. All values are evaluated at the steady state level of capital stock
(kss) with zero liquidity holding (c=k = 0).
shock, z = 1. The graphs are evaluated at the steady state level of capital stock (kss) with
zero liquidity holding (c=k = 0).
Figure 1.4 indicates that a rm with low protability shock realization confronts large
debt servicing costs. The marginal value of liquidity at the low protability shock state
is initially higher and increases more sharply in response to the increase in leverage ratio,
compared to the liquidity value at the neutral protability shock scenario. For the low
protability shock rm, to be specic, the marginal value of liquidity is 1.014 with no debt
obligations and it rises sharply to 1.06 when the rms leverage ratio grows to 0.9. The
di¤erence of the marginal value of liquidity in between two di¤erent protability states is
initially 1.4% and widens to 3.5% when the leverage ratio reaches to 0.9.
A low protability shock realization increases the marginal value of liquidity in two ways.
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Figure 1.5: Marginal Value of Liquidity: High Equity Financing Costs













Panel B. Higher Equity Financing Costs
z = 0.3
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Panel A. High Equity Financing Costs
z = 0.3
z = 1
Panel A describes the marginal value of liquidity where xed and convex equity nancing costs are 10 times
higher than the baseline estimates. Panel B depicts the marginal value of liquidity where xed and convex
equity nancing costs are 100 times higher than the baseline estimates. In both Panels A and B, the marginal
value of liquidity for two di¤erent states of the protability shock (z = 0:3; 1) are plotted along with the
leverage ratio variation. All values are evaluated at the steady state level of capital stock (kss) with zero
liquidity holding (c=k = 0).
First, a low operating prot implies more limited internal funds to service debt payments,
given a specic amount of cash stock. Second, a currently low protability shock predicts
low future operating prots in the future, due to the positive serial correlation in a rms
prot generation. The parameter  captures this persistency of protability shock in the
model. Low current internal funds and low expected operating prots altogether increase the
marginal value of liquidity, in spite of low investment demands implied by a low protability
shock.
Figure 1.5 analyzes the e¤ect of large external nancing costs on the marginal value of
liquidity. The gure plots the marginal value of liquidity for a neutral protability shock
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(z = 1) and a low protability shock (z = 0:3) scenarios at the steady state level of capital
stock (kss) with zero liquidity holding (c=k = 0). In Panel A, the xed and convex equity
nancing costs are 10 times higher than the baseline estimates. In Panel B, both equity
nancing costs are 100 times larger than the baseline costs.
Figure 1.5 indicates that higher equity nancing costs considerably raise debt servicing
costs. Both Panels A and B show the soaring marginal value of liquidity in response to
growing debt obligations. As expected, the marginal value of liquidity arises more sharply in
Panel B where both equity nancing costs are far higher than those of Panel A. For instance,
the marginal value of liquidity with a low protability shock (z = 0:3) is 1.5 in Panel A and
5.5 in Panel B, when the leverage ratio is 0.9.
Figure 1.4 and 1.5 provide new insights on a rms disaster risk and debt policy. In
a disaster period as the recent nancial crisis of 2008, a rms protability drops sharply
and equity nancing costs tends to increase considerably. Figure 1.4 points out that a low
protability shock raises debt servicing costs substantially even in the absence of any nancial
distress costs. Figure 1.5 veries the material combined e¤ect of low protability shocks and
high external nancing costs on debt servicing costs. A rm may use debt conservatively
to avoid massive debt servicing costs in disaster periods, even if the rm has a negligible
likelihood of bankruptcy during the disaster periods.
To summarize, debt servicing costs are positively related with large debt obligations,
a low level of capital stock, a low current protability, and large external nancing costs.
These ndings provide new insights on a number of empirical puzzles, such as the debt
conservatism puzzle, low leverage in small rms and the relationship between disaster risk
and debt policy.
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Table 1.3: Financing and Investment Policies at Equity Issuance
Net Debt Issuance Positive (b0 > b) Zero (b0 = b) Negative (b0 < b)
Variables Cond. Mean Cond. Mean Cond. Mean
Proportion of Regime 0.2241 0.7405 0.0354
Equity Proceeds ( d=k) 0.0293 0.0626 0.0702
Current Cash (c=k) 0.0121 0.1997 0.2957
Next Period Cash (c0=k0) 0.0000 0.1676 0.2779
Current Investment (I=k) 0.2797 0.1998 -0.0005
Next Period Investment (I 0=k0) 0.0894 0.1575 0.0849
Current Prot (=k) 0.1991 0.1273 0.0517
Next Period Prot (0=k0) 0.1922 0.1424 0.0810
Current Leverage (b=k) 0.1984 0.1981 0.2301
Next Period Leverage (b0=k0) 0.2493 0.1813 0.1037
This table reports a variety of moment statistics from the baseline model simulation
when the rm issues equity. Conditional on the rms equity issuance, three di¤erent net
debt issuance regimes-positive, zero and negative are analyzed. The conditional mean of
fraction of each regime, equity proceeds, and current and next period cash, investment,
operating prots and leverage are documented. All variables are self-explanatory.
1.3.4 Equity Financing and Cash Retention
This section analyzes investment and nancing policies when a rm uses equity nancing,
and highlights the cash retention role of equity proceeds.
Table 1.3 reports a rms nancing and investment policies at equity issuance from the
baseline model simulation. To highlight distinctive roles of equity nancing, the table doc-
uments nancing and investment policies according to positive (b0 > b), zero (b0 = b), and
negative (b0 < b) net debt issuance cases, conditional on equity nancing. The proportion of
each net debt issuance category is reported on top of the Table 1.3. The conditional mean of
equity proceeds ( d=k), and current and next period cash holding (c=k), investment (I=k),
prot (=k), and leverage ratio (b=k) are documented for three di¤erent net debt issuance
scenarios.
Noticeably, equity nancing in the model is rarely used for retiring debt obligations.
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Only 3.5% of equity issuance is associated with negative net debt issuance, which points to a
minor role of equity nancing in retiring debt obligations. This nding is consistent with the
infrequent use of proactive equity nancing in Denis and McKeon (2012). They document
that public rms rarely use equity nancing to retire prior surges in debt obligations.
In the majority of cases, a rms equity proceeds are used for cash retention as well as
capital expenditure, especially when it faces large current and future investments. The cash
retention role of equity nancing is highlighted in the zero net debt issuance case, accounting
for more than 74% of total equity nancing. Most noticeably, a rm faces large current and
future investment demands above average in the zero net debt issuance regime. While large
next period investments (I 0=k0 = 0:1575) imply a large value of liquidity, a rm has to
drain its cash stocks (c=k = 0:1997) to fund currently vast investments (I=k = 0:1998).
To accumulate a substantial amount of cash stock again, the rm tries to use its current
operating prots (=k = 0:1273) and equity proceeds (d=k = 0:0626). This cash retention
role hinges on no servicing cost property of equity nancing. A rm can stockpile cash for
the future use by issuing equity because current equity nancing does not deplete valuable
liquidity in the future.
This nding is closely associated with a number of empirical regularities in equity -
nancing. Equity proceeds are largely used for near term cash saving (DeAngelo et al. 2010)
and the cash saving propensity of equity proceeds is far higher than that of debt proceeds
(McLean 2011). An equity issuance decision is generally concurrent with large current and
future investments (Loughran and Ritter 1997; Fama and French 2002). Large current and
future investments may also drive frequent equity nancing in small growth rms (Frank and
Goyal 2003). Large cash ow rich rms can avoid equity nancing because these rms can
easily use their operating prots for cash saving, which incur neither nancing nor servicing
costs (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999).
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The emphasis on the cash retention role of equity issuance di¤ers markedly from prior
security choice theories. The dynamic trade-o¤models with infrequent leverage adjustments
focus on the role of equity proceeds in paying down debt obligations (Strebulaev 2007).
The pecking-order theory underlines large asymmetric information cost involved in equity
nancing and emphasizes its inferiority to debt nancing (Myers and Majluf 1984). In
contrast, the model simulation result highlights the cash retention role of equity nancing in
the view of servicing costs; equity nancing can be used for cash retention because it does
not deplete liquidity in the future.
Finally, a rm uses equity proceeds solely for capital expenditure in the case of positive
net debt issuance, which takes account of 22% of total equity nancing. All operating
prots, current cash stocks and equity proceeds are used to nance currently large capital
expenditure (I=k = 0:2797). High protability (0=k0 = 0:1922) and low investment needs
(I 0=k0 = 0:0894) in the next period imply a low marginal value of liquidity. As a result,
the rm has low incentive to save cash stock from additional equity proceeds and carries
no cash for the future use (c0=k0 = 0). Empirically, this nancing role of equity proceeds is
particularly signicant in human capital intensive rms. Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009)
document the importance of equity issuance for funding investments in R&D intensive rms
during 1990s.
To summarize, in the majority of cases, equity proceeds are used for cash retention as well
as capital expenditure, particularly when a rm faces large current and future investments.
This nding is consistent with recent empirical studies such as DeAngelo et al. (2010),
Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Fama and French (2002). On the other hand, a rm rarely
issues equity for retiring debt obligations. This result is consistent with the minor role of
proactive equity nancing (Denis and McKeon 2012), but contradicts recent dynamic trade-
o¤ models with infrequent leverage adjustment (Strebulaev 2007).
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1.4 Comparative Statics
This section investigates how large debt servicing costs a¤ect a rms capital structure choice.
It emphasizes low leverage and frequent equity nancing tendencies for a rm with large debt
servicing costs. The variations of xed operating costs and convex capital adjustment costs
are considered here to capture the inuence of large debt servicing costs on debt and equity
nancing policies.
1.4.1 Comparative Statics I: Fixed Operating Cost
A higher xed operating cost is closely associated with large debt servicing costs. An in-
crease in xed operating costs decreases a rms protability without incurring considerable
changes in a rms investment demands because this adjustment does not a¤ect the mar-
ginal protability of investments. Therefore, a rm with large xed operating costs tends to
confront a higher marginal value of liquidity.
Figure 1.6 conrms this e¤ect of xed operating costs on the marginal value of liquidity.
The marginal value of liquidity is plotted against the leverage ratio variation for the baseline
xed operating costs,  = 0:0251, and for high xed operating costs,  = 0:035, in the case
of no liquidity holding (c = 0). The marginal value of liquidity is evaluated at the steady
state level of capital stock (kss) with a neutral protability shock (z = 1).
The gure demonstrates that a rm with higher xed operating costs faces a large mar-
ginal value of liquidity. The marginal value of liquidity is initially higher and grows more
sharply for the rm with high xed operating costs. Although the detailed variations are
not documented here, this qualitative prediction remains unchanged for di¤erent levels of
capital stock, protability shock and liquidity holding.
Table 1.4 shows the e¤ects of xed operating cost variations on a rms investment and
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Figure 1.6: Marginal Value of Liquidity: Fixed Operating Cost













The marginal value of liquidity is plotted at the steady state level of capital stock (kss) with zero liquidity
holding (c = 0). Two di¤erent levels of xed operating costs are examined ( = 0:0251;  = 0:035). All
values are evaluated along with the leverage ratio variation at a neutral protability shock (z = 1).
nancing policies. The xed operating cost parameter  varies from 0 to 0.04 and all other
economic parameters are xed at the baseline estimates of Table 1.2. Table 1.4 reports
the mean and variance of investment (I=k), leverage (b=k), and cash holding (c=k). It also
documents the average operating prots (=k), the frequency of equity nancing (d < 0),
and the amount of equity nancing ( d=k; d < 0):
As expected, higher xed operating costs lead to lower average protability without
incurring signicant changes in investment demand. An increase in xed operating costs
has negligible e¤ects on investment policy in terms of mean and variance of investments.
The average investment (row 1) and the variance of investment (row 2) remain stable for
all di¤erent levels of xed operating costs. Yet, the average protability drops signicantly
as the xed operating costs increase. The average prot is initially 0.22 with the low xed
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Table 1.4: Fixed Operating Cost Variation
Fixed Operating Costs Low High
Avg. Investment (I=k) 0.1310 0.1310 0.1314 0.1315 0.1320
Var. Investment(I=k) 0.0230 0.0228 0.0239 0.0242 0.0243
Avg. Leverage (b=k) 0.7675 0.3751 0.2271 0.0892 0.0213
Var. Leverage (b=k) 0.0245 0.0103 0.0149 0.0136 0.0031
Avg. Prot (=k) 0.2199 0.2019 0.1741 0.1648 0.1463
Equity Issuance Freq. (d < 0) 0.0195 0.0305 0.1017 0.1193 0.1288
Avg. Equity Financing ( d=k; d < 0) 0.0354 0.0387 0.0555 0.0579 0.0764
Avg. Cash Holding (c=k) 0.0975 0.0969 0.1150 0.1634 0.4185
Var. Cash Holding (c=k) 0.0130 0.0123 0.0164 0.0321 0.1040
This table reports a variety of nancing and investment moments along with xed
operating cost variations. I simulate the model for 102,000 periods and drop rst
2000 observations. The representative rm changes its investment and nancing pol-
icy in response to the series of protability shock realizations. Each column reports
selected nancing and investment variables corresponding to di¤erent xed operating
cost parameters () of 0, 0.01, 0.0251, 0.03 and 0.04, respectively. All variables are
self-explanatory and other structural parameters are set to the baseline estimates of
Table 1.2.
operating cost scenario,  = 0, but it decreases to 0.145 when the xed operating cost
parameter  becomes 0.04 (row 5).
Table 1.4 highlights that a rm with higher xed operating costs tends to have lower
leverage and rely more heavily on equity nancing. To be specic, the average leverage
decreases by more than 95% and the variance of leverage diminishes by almost 90% as the
xed operating cost parameter  increases from 0 to 0.04 (row 3 and 4). Given the same
xed operating cost variation, equity nancing frequency increases more than ten times and
the amount of equity proceeds becomes more than doubled (row 6 and 7).
The e¤ect of xed operating costs on cash holding policy is indeterminate. The aver-
age cash holding slightly decreases between the rst two columns but gradually increases
afterwards (row 8). This inconclusive direction may stem from the endogeneity in the joint
decisions of liquidity and debt policies. A higher marginal value of liquidity indicates large
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Table 1.5: Fixed Operating Cost Variation: Robustness
Variables Serial Corr.() Uncertainty() DRS()
Low High Low High Low High
Panel A: Low Cost (=0.0)
Avg. Leverage(b=k) 0.8670 0.3672 0.9326 0.3708 0.9007 0.3982
Equity Freq. (d < 0) 0.0302 0.0354 0.0393 0.0091 0.0111 0.0041
Avg. Equity Financing ( d=k; d < 0) 0.0309 0.0451 0.0265 0.0435 0.1365 0.0167
Panel B: Baseline (=0.0251)
Avg. Leverage(b=k) 0.2984 0.1190 0.2731 0.0553 0.2350 0.1590
Equity Freq. (d < 0) 0.1013 0.1009 0.0810 0.0472 0.0484 0.0448
Avg. Equity Financing ( d=k; d < 0) 0.0563 0.0710 0.0549 0.0651 0.1983 0.0280
This table reports average leverage(b=k), equity nancing frequency(d < 0) and average equity
nancing amount ( d=k, d < 0) based on the model with a low xed operating cost ( = 0;
Panel A) and with the baseline xed cost ( = 0:0251; Panel B). The rst two columns contrast
low and high serial correlation cases in the protability shock, where  = 0:6 and  = 0:8,
respectively. The next two columns are for low and high uncertainty cases in the protability
shock where  is 0.12 and 0.3, respectively. The last two columns are for low and high returns
to scale scenarios of the prot function, where  = 0:6 and  = 0:8, respectively.
debt servicing costs given the same amount of debt obligations, ex-ante. Yet, a rm with
large debt servicing costs endogenously selects a low leverage ratio, which potentially un-
dermines the rms cash retention incentives, ex-post. The average liquidity holding ratio
reects these counter-balancing e¤ects from growing debt servicing costs.
Table 1.5 shows the robustness of the xed operating cost predictions on the capital
structure choice. The rm with low xed operating costs (Panel A) always relies more
heavily on debt nancing for high and low uncertainty scenarios of the protability shock,
for high and low serial correlations in operating prots, and for high and low decreasing
returns to scale parameters. A rm with low xed operating costs also uses equity nancing
less frequently than the rm with the baseline xed operating costs does, in line with the
results of Table 1.4.
These quantitative predictions are consistent with recent empirical ndings on the re-
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lationship between operating leverage and external nancing policies. Kahl et al. (2012)
uniquely analyze the e¤ect of operating leverage on a rms nancing policies. They mainly
show that higher operating leverage rms tend to maintain lower leverage and issue equity
to a greater extent. Their ndings are in line with the quantitative predictions of Table 1.4
and 1.5.
1.4.2 Comparative Statics II: Convex Capital Adjustment Costs
Capital installation and liquidation incur organizational costs (Hamermesh and Pfann 1997).
The accumulation and resale of capital stock lead to the hiring or ring new workers, which
may involve training, search, or severance costs. In addition, the extant workers may nd
their routine disrupted and their tasks reassigned when a rm purchases or sells its capital
stock. This reallocation process may lower labor productivity and increase capital adjust-
ment costs.
Higher convex capital adjustment costs lead to slow adjustments of capital stock and
large costs of asset sales. A high capital resale cost is especially and closely associated with
large debt servicing costs. As depicted in Figure 1.1, a rm increases its asset sales to service
large debt obligations and these asset sales tend to be more costly with higher capital resale
costs.
Figure 1.7 shows the implication of convex capital adjustment cost variations on debt
servicing costs. The marginal value of liquidity is plotted for two di¤erent levels of convex
capital adjustment costs, the baseline, k = 0:1163, and high cost, k = 30:1163, scenarios.
The marginal value of liquidity is evaluated along with the leverage ratio at the steady state
of capital stock (kss) with a neutral protability shock (z = 1) and zero liquidity holding
(c = 0). All other economic parameters are set to the values of Table 1.2 except the xed
capital adjustment costs: the parameter k is set to zero to isolate the e¤ect of convex capital
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Figure 1.7: Marginal Value of Liquidity: Convex Capital Adjustment Costs













The marginal value of liquidity is plotted at the steady state level of capital stock (kss) with zero liquidity
holding (c = 0). Two di¤erent levels of convex capital adjustment cost are examined (k = 0:1163; k =
30:1163). All values are evaluated along with the leverage ratio variation with a neutral protability shock
(z = 1).
adjustment costs.
Figure 1.6 points out that a rm with high convex capital adjustment costs faces large
debt servicing costs, especially those with a considerable amount of debt obligations. The
baseline and high convex capital adjustment cost rms confront the same marginal value of
liquidity until the leverage ratio becomes 0.3. Yet, the high convex capital adjustment cost
rm shows a greater marginal value of liquidity than the baseline cost rm does when the
leverage ratio is larger than 0.3. This nding is in line with the increasing tendency of asset
sales to service additional debt obligations, as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Table 1.6 compares investment and nancing policies for di¤erent levels of convex capital
adjustment costs, which vary from 0.1 to 3 times of the baseline convex capital adjustment
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Table 1.6: Convex Capital Adjustment Cost Variation
Convex Capital Adjustment Cost Low High
Avg. Investment (I=k) 0.1625 0.1307 0.1248 0.1222 0.1214
Var. Investment(I=k) 0.0885 0.0215 0.0096 0.0044 0.0027
Avg. Leverage (b=k) 0.1952 0.1770 0.1761 0.1655 0.1419
Var. Leverage (b=k) 0.0171 0.0129 0.0084 0.0036 0.0034
Avg. Prot (=k) 0.1647 0.1681 0.1701 0.1727 0.1743
Equity Issuance Freq. (d < 0) 0.0051 0.0095 0.0203 0.0368 0.0373
Avg. Equity Financing ( d=k; d < 0) 0.0548 0.0719 0.0558 0.0484 0.0548
Avg. Cash Holding (c=k) 0.2957 0.1096 0.0638 0.0370 0.0276
Var. Cash Holding (c=k) 0.1329 0.0260 0.0084 0.0026 0.0023
This table reports a variety of nancing and investment moments along with xed
operating cost variation. Each column indicates a di¤erent level of convex capital
adjustment cost; the values are 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, and 3 times of the baseline convex capital
adjustment cost in Table 1.2. The xed capital adjustment cost parameter is set to
0 and the other parameter values are from the baseline estimates of Table 1.2. All
variables are self explanatory.
cost estimate. To focus on the role of convexity in capital adjustment costs, the xed cost
parameter k is set to zero. All other economic parameters are xed at the baseline estimates
in Table 1.2. Table 1.6 reports the mean and variance of investment (I=k), leverage (b=k),
and cash stock (c=k). It also documents the average operating prots (=k), the frequency
of equity nancing (d < 0), and the amount of equity proceeds ( d=k, d < 0):
Table 1.6 shows that a rm with high convex capital adjustment costs is closely associated
with lower leverage and more frequent equity nancing. The average leverage ratio drops
by almost 25% as convex capital adjustment costs increase. Notice that the leverage ratio
is 0.19 in the rst column, but decreases to 0.14 in the last column (row 3). The frequency
of equity nancing also gradually increases from 0.5% to 3% for the same convex capital
adjustment costs variation (row 6). The average equity proceeds are stable around 5% of
capital stock for all levels of convex capital adjustment costs (row 7). Even with slightly
higher protability (row 5), a higher convexity in capital adjustment costs leads to lower
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nancial leverage and more frequent equity nancing.
Interestingly, a higher convex capital adjustment cost rm tends to hold lower cash hold-
ing (row 8). This appears inconsistent with a large value of liquidity from a higher convex
capital adjustment cost in Figure 1.7. Two economic forces may explain such decline in
average cash holding ratio. First, endogenous decisions of leverage and cash holding poten-
tially play an important role, as discussed in the previous section. An economic environment
generating large debt servicing costs raises the marginal value of liquidity, given the same
amount of debt obligations, ex ante. However, a rm optimally maintains lower leverage,
which potentially undermines cash holding incentives, ex post. The latter e¤ects could be
more signicant in the convex capital adjustment costs variation.
To investigate another potential reason for the diminishing cash holding tendency, Figure
1.8 examines the relationship between convex capital adjustment costs and the marginal
value of liquidity, for two di¤erent levels of the protability shock. The marginal value of
liquidity is evaluated for the baseline and high convex capital adjustment costs (k = 0:1163,
k = 30:1163) at the steady state level of capital stock (kss) with zero cash holding (c = 0).
Panel A describes the case with a low protability shock, z = 0:3, whereas Panel B depicts
the case with a high protability shock, z = 1:5. All other economic conditions are identical
to those explained in Figure 1.7.
Panels A and B illustrate contrasting patterns of the marginal value of liquidity for the
baseline and high convex capital adjustment cost rms, depending on the protability shock
realizations. While the baseline convex capital adjustment cost rm shows a lower marginal
value of liquidity in Panel A consistent with Figure 1.7, the baseline cost rm rather exhibits
a higher marginal value of liquidity than the high convex capital adjustment cost rm does
in Panel B. This nding is closely associated with the role of low convex capital adjustment
costs enabling more rapid accumulation of capital stocks. Given the same high protability
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Figure 1.8: Marignal Value of Liquidity: Convex Capital Adjustment Costs and Protability
Shock









Panel A. Low Profitability Shock, z=0.3













The marginal value of liquidity is plotted at the steady state level of capital stock (kss) with zero cash
holding. Panel A describes a low protability shock case (z=0.3) and Panel B describes a high protability
shock case (z = 1:5). Two di¤erent levels of convex capital adjustment cost are examined (k = 0:1163,
k = 3 0:1163). All values are evaluated along with the leverage ratio variation.
shock realization, the low convex capital adjustment cost rm tries to build up a larger
amount of capital stock, which raises the marginal value liquidity more substantially. The
decreasing average cash holding ratio may stem from the higher marginal value of liquidity
in a lower convex capital adjustment cost rm at high protability shock states.
Table 1.7 shows the robustness of the convex capital adjustment cost predictions on the
capital structure choice. The external nancing policy predictions from large debt servicing
costs remain unchanged for high and low uncertainty cases in the protability shock, for
high and low serial correlations in operating prots, and for high and low decreasing returns
to scale parameters. Consistent with the result in Table 1.6, the higher convex capital
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Table 1.7: Convex Capital Adjustment Costs Variations: Robustness
Variables Serial Corr.() Uncertainty() DRS()
Low High Low High Low High
Panel A: Baseline
Avg. Leverage(b=k) 0.2051 0.1132 0.2037 0.0559 0.2045 0.1605
Equity Freq. (e > 0) 0.0154 0.1019 0.0077 0.0625 0.0163 0.0386
Avg. Equity Financing (e=k) 0.0579 0.0646 0.0480 0.0594 0.2354 0.0280
Panel B: High Convex Capital Adjustment Cost
Avg. Leverage(b=k) 0.1293 0.0936 0.1792 0.0165 0.1969 0.1276
Equity Freq. (e > 0) 0.0408 0.1330 0.0192 0.0705 0.0215 0.1257
Avg. Equity Financing (e=k) 0.0575 0.0674 0.0425 0.0854 0.2615 0.0306
This table reports average leverage (b=k), equity nancing frequency (d > 0) and average equity nancing
amount (d=k) calculated from the simulation of the baseline convex capital adjustment costs (k = 0:1163;
Panel A) and high convex capital adjustment cost (k = 30:1163); Panel B. The rst two columns contrast
low and high serial correlation cases in the protability shock, where  =0.6 and  =0.8, respectively. The
next two columns are for low and high uncertainty cases in the protability shock where  is 0.12 and 0.3,
respectively. The last two columns are for low and high returns to scale scenarios of the prot function,
where  = 0.6 and  =0.8, respectively.
adjustment cost rm (Panel B) always uses equity nancing more frequently and maintains
lower leverage than the baseline cost rm does (Panel A).
The frequent equity nancing and low leverage in human capital intensive rms are closely
associated with the results of Table 1.6 and 1.7. Hall (2002) points out the rigidity in wage
payments and the rm specicity of human capital stocks as economic forces behind large
organizational costs of adjusting R&D expenditures. Consistent with the external nancing
regularities in R&D intensive rms, my model predicts that a rm with higher convex capital
adjustment costs tends to show low leverage and use equity nancing more actively.
The debt servicing cost predictions on convex capital adjustment costs di¤er markedly
from DDW. In their model, a rm with high convex capital adjustment costs shows higher
leverage, which contrasts the above predictions. With limited debt capacity, a low convex
capital adjustment cost rm has an additional incentive to save its debt capacity to prepare
36
for highly volatile investment demands. This incentive of debt capacity preservation drives
lower leverage in a rm with low convex capital adjustment costs. Yet, the issuance of
debt does not involve any explicit costs in their model, which potentially underestimates the
e¤ects of increasing asset sales cost on a rms debt policy.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
I have examined the interdependence between liquidity policy and capital structure choice
and shown it to be a key missing link in the existing literature. Debt servicing costs lie at
the core of the analysis; servicing debt is costly because it drains a rms valuable liquidity.
To examine the implications of debt servicing costs on a rms external nancing policies,
I developed a new dynamic trade-o¤ model with liquidity management and adopted the
marginal value of liquidity as a natural measure of debt servicing costs.
My model analysis yielded a number of interesting results. Most of all, a rm with large
debt obligations faces a higher cost of debt, even in the absence of nancial distress costs.
Next, a smaller rm may have lower leverage ratio because its large investment demands
increase debt servicing costs. Lastly, equity nancing could be used for cash retention,
especially for rms with large current and future investments, because it does not deplete
valuable future liquidity.
These ndings provide novel insights on a variety of puzzling empirical regularities. Most
of all, the debt servicing costs provide an economic explanation for why a rm may exercise
conservative debt policy even in the face of low nancial costs (Graham 2000). Indeed,
many economic factors closely associated with conservative debt policy suggest the potential
importance of debt servicing costs in resolving the debt conservatism puzzle. Next, the
marginal value of liquidity directly connects large investments with lower leverage in smaller
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rms (Frank and Goyal 2008), regardless of limited debt capacity considerations (DDW). In
fact, equity proceeds are primarily used for cash retention (DeAngelo et al. 2010) and equity
nancing is generally concurrent with large current and future investments (Loughran and
Ritter 1997). This cash retention role of equity proceeds di¤ers markedly from prior theories
highlighting large informational costs in equity issuance (Myers and Majluf 1984) or the role
of equity proceeds for debt payments (Strebulaev 2007).
My study highlights several lucrative opportunities for future research. Most of all, the
risk premium involved in a rms debt issuance is an important topic. A large risk premium
drains a rms liquidity more substantially, but increases the amount of interest tax shields.
The trade-o¤between large debt servicing costs and growing tax shields provides more precise
understanding on a rms capital structure choice. Incorporating market timing aspect of
equity nancing is another direction. The market timing consideration of equity nancing
is empirically important (Baker and Wurgler 2002), but is not well captured in my model.
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Chapter 2
Empirical Analysis on Debt Servicing Costs
2.1 Introduction
This chapter empirically supports the theoretical considerations on debt servicing costs in the
previous chapter. For this purpose, I study the simulated method of moments estimation
in detail, and cross-sectionally investigate the debt servicing costs predictions on capital
structure policies.
I adopted the simulated method of moments (SMM) estimation to obtain important
structural parameters of my previous model. The SMM estimation nds a set of structural
parameters driving the moments of articially simulated data from a model as close as
possible to the corresponding empirical moments. In my model, this estimation procedure
helps ensure close relationships between the models quantitative predictions and a rms
nancing and investment policy in the real world. I investigate the statistical properties of
the SMM estimator and demonstrate the identication strategy used for the baseline model
calibration in Chapter 1.
In the second half of this chapter, I study the validity of debt servicing costs predictions on
capital structure policy. I quantitatively predicted that an economic environment associated
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with large debt servicing costs leads to lower leverage ratios and frequent equity nancing
activities. I test these empirical predictions for publicly traded U.S. rms.
For this purpose, I conduct four cross-sectional studies. First, I examine the role of
convex capital adjustment costs on a rms capital structure policies. The previous chapter
demonstrated that higher convex capital adjustment costs raise the costs of asset sales that
lead to large debt servicing costs. To test the empirical predictions from large debt servicing
costs, I calculate each individual rms convex capital adjustment costs based on Eberly
(1997)s approach, and then introduce quartile dummy variables to indicate high and low
adjustment cost rms. Consistent with the debt servicing cost predictions, my empirical
analysis conrms more conservative debt policy and frequent equity nancing activities for
rms with higher convex capital adjustment costs.
Next, I investigate the relationship between xed operating costs and capital structure
choice. My quantitative analysis in the previous chapter predicts lower leverage ratios and
frequent equity nancing for rms with higher xed operating costs. To test these quantita-
tive predictions, I build up a measure of xed operating costs by modifying the estimation
method used in Kahl et al. (2012). I obtain each individual rms xed operating mea-
sure rst, which captures the sensitivity of operating cost growths to sales growths. Then I
construct quartile indicator variables from individual rms estimates. In line with the quan-
titative predictions of Chapter 1, higher xed operating costs rms maintain lower leverage
ratios and issue equity more frequently than lower xed operating costs rms do.
Moreover, I cross-sectionally study the relationship between a rms prot volatility and
capital structure policies. Provided the same protability state, a higher volatility in prots
indicates a greater likelihood of low protability state realizations, which results in an expec-
tation of large debt servicing costs. I directly measure the volatility of prots by calculating
the variance of operating prots for each individual rm. Then I construct quartile dummy
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variables to select high and low prot volatility rms and use these indicators as explanatory
variables for my cross-sectional analysis. Consistent with the debt servicing cost predictions,
rms with highly volatile prots tend to show lower leverage ratios and more frequent equity
nancing activities.
Finally, I study how future investment demands a¤ect a rms debt and equity nancing
policies. Massive operating needs for future investment raise the marginal value of liquidity
next period, leading to an expectation of large debt servicing costs in current debt issuance.
To obtain the measure of future large investment demands, I rstly assign the relative ranking
of investment-asset ratios to each individual rm. I dene indicator variables for small and
large future investments based on this relative investment-asset ratio quartile. My cross-
sectional analysis conrms that rms expecting large future investment demands use debt
more conservatively and equity more frequently, in spite of their higher protability. This
nding contradicts the standard trade-o¤ theory predictions on equity nancing where a
rm avoids equity issuance in the face of large unused tax shields and high protability. The
consideration of investment variables also weakens the puzzling negative correlation between
protability and leverage ratios (Frank and Goyal 2008), which suggests a potential role of
debt servicing costs restraining debt issuance during high protability states.
The rst half of this chapter examines the statistical property of the SMM estimator and
detailed identication scheme used for my baseline model calibration in the previous chapter.
The second half of this chapter conrms the validity of debt servicing costs predictions
on capital structure policies. As expected, a rm with higher convex capital adjustment
costs, higher xed operating costs, highly volatile protability generations, and larger future
investment needs is closely associated with lower leverage ratios and more frequent equity
nancing activities. Especially, my empirical analysis on future investment needs suggests
that the debt servicing cost considerations could be potentially related with other empirical
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puzzles in capital structure literature such as the puzzling negative correlation between
prots and leverage ratios.
The next section investigates the SMM estimation procedure in detail. Section 3 cross-
sectionally analyzes the debt servicing costs predictions on capital structure policies. Section
4 concludes.
2.2 Calibration: Simulated Method of Moments
2.2.1 Simulated Method of Moments
The SMM objective function is a weighted sum of squared errors, in which the "errors"
are given by the di¤erence between the empirical moments vector and its model simulation
counterpart. The vector of empirical moments as M(x), in which x is an i.i.d data sample.
The vector of simulated moments is denoted as m(y; ), in which y is a simulated data
sample. I denote the objective function as Q(x; y; ):
Q(x; y; ) = (M(x) m(y; ))0W (M(x) m(y; )); (2.1)
where W is a weighting matrix.
I denote J as the ratio of the number of observations in the simulated data set to the
number observations in the real data set, N . By choosing the optimal weighting matrix W,



























The test of the over-identifying restrictions can be denoted as:
NJ
1 + J
Q(x; y; ): (2.3)
2.2.2 Identication
As briey illustrated in the previous chapter, I x a group of structural parameters at
economically reasonable values to e¢ ciently estimate the model parameters. The tax rate
for positive taxable corporate income, +c ; is set to 0.35, which is the maximum of corporate
tax rate during the sample period. DDW use the same value for their corporate tax rate. The
tax rate for negative taxable income,  c ; is xed at 0.09 reecting the e¤ective tax rate on
negative EBT from the taxation function of Hennessy and Whited (2005). The depreciation
rate,  is 0.12 similar to Hennessy and Whited (2005) and DDW. The risk free interest rate,
r; is 0.025 and the interest income tax,  i, is 0.25, consistent with Hennessy and Whited
(2005).
I estimate the following parameters via the SMM procedure: the uncertainty ; and serial
correlation ; of the protability shock; the prot function curvature ; the xed capital
adjustment cost k and convex capital adjustment cost k; the xed equity nancing cost e
and convex equity nancing cost e; the baseline debt nancing cost  b and the additional
debt nancing cost b; and the xed operating cost parameter :
The global identication of a SMM estimator is achieved if the expected value of the
di¤erence between the simulated moments and the data moments equals zero if and only if
the structural parameters equal their true values. To correctly identify structural parame-
ters, I pick up the following 13 moments; the rst and second moments of investment, cash,
leverage and operating prots; the rst moment of dividends, Tobinsq, and equity proceeds;
the serial correlation of operating prots and the frequency of equity nancing. My identi-
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cation scheme is closely associated with the identication strategy of DDW. The average
and variance of investment help identify the capital adjustment cost parameters, k and k.
A higher convex capital adjustment cost decreases the average and variance of investment
and a higher xed capital adjustment cost raises the variance of investment. The average
operating prots help identity the curvature of prot function, a and the xed operating
cost parameter, : As discussed in DDW, a higher  raises average prot (zk  kss=k) and
a higher xed operating cost parameter,  lowers average operating prots. The serial cor-
relation of the protability shock, ; and the xed operating parameter, ; a¤ects the serial
correlations in operating prots. A higher xed operating cost increases the correlations in
prot generation. The variance of prot helps capture the uncertainty parameter of prot
evolution, . The average dividends and Tobins q are closely associated with the value of
rm.
The other moment selections pertain to a rms nancing decision. The frequency of
equity nancing and average amount of equity nancing play important roles in the iden-
tication of xed and convex equity issuance cost parameters, e and e: The average and
variance of leverage help pin down the baseline debt nancing cost,  b and the additional
nancing cost component, b: A higher baseline nancing cost lowers the average leverage.
A higher additional nancing cost decreases the variance of leverage because it provides ad-
ditional incentive to maintain debt obligations from an option value of debt issuance. The
mean and variance of cash holding ratio also help identify these two debt nancing costs.
A high debt nancing costs,  b provides additional incentive to cash retention because it
increases a rms external nancing costs. A higher additional cost parameter, b implies
large incentives to save cash.
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Table 2.1: Moments Selection: Acutal and Simulated Values
Variables Actual Moments Simulated Moments
Avg. Investment(I=k) 0.1341 0.1314
Avg. Leverage(b=k) 0.2251 0.2267
Avg. Tobins q(V + b  c)=k) 1.7013 1.7095
Avg. Prot (=k) 0.1731 0.1741
Equity Issuance Freq. (d < 0) 0.1072 0.1017
Avg. Equity Financing( d=k; d < 0) 0.0597 0.0554
Avg. Dividends (d=k; d > 0) 0.0374 0.0323
Var. Investment(I=k) 0.0225 0.0239
Var. Prot (=k) 0.0045 0.0037
SerialCor. Prot (=k) 0.6315 0.6327
Var. Leverage(b=k) 0.0124 0.0149
Avg. Cash Holding (c=k) 0.1150 0.1144
Var. Cash Holding (c=k) 0.0170 0.0163
The actual moments calculations are based on a sample of non nancial, unreg-
ulated rms from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database. The sample period is
19882010. The simulated moments are from the baseline model simulation eval-
uated at the SMM estimates. All moment variables are self-explanatory and the
construction of empirical moments is described in Appendix A.
2.2.3 Estimation Results
Table 2.1 reports the selected moments variables for the identication of the model. The table
also documents the empirical moments based on CRSP/Compustat merged database from
1988 to 2010 and the simulated moments from the model at the baseline SMM estimates.
Table 2.2 reports the baseline economic parameters estimated via the SMM procedure.
As explained in the previous chapter, the estimation results are all in line with the prior
estimates. The persistency parameter  is 0.6718, the uncertainty parameter  is 0.1995,
and the returns to scale parameter  is 0.7435, all of which are consistent with DDW and
Hennessy and Whited (2005). The xed capital adjustment cost parameter k is 0.0090
and the convex capital adjustment cost k is 0.1163. Both parameters estimates are within
economically reasonable ranges, in line with DDW, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), and
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Table 2.2: Structural Parameter Estimation Results
   k k e e  b b  J-test (p-value)
0.6718 0.1995 0.7435 0.0090 0.1163 0.0045 0.0003 0.0011 0.0071 0.0251 0.2712
This table reports the estimated structural parameters and the result of over-identication test. The value
 and  are the persistency and uncertainty of the protability shock process (log z).  is the curvature of
prot function. k and k are the xed and convex capital adjustment costs. e and e govern the xed and
convex equity nancing cost.  b1 is the baseline debt nancing cost and  
b
2 captures the increase in marginal
debt nancing cost when the rms net debt issuance is positive.  is the xed operating cost parameter
proportional to the steady state state capital stock kss. The J-test is the 2 test for the over-identifying
restrictions of the model. Its p-value is reported.
Whited (1992). The convex equity nancing cost e is 0.0003, close to the estimate of
Hennessy and Whited (2007). The baseline debt issuance cost  b is 0.11% for all proceeds.
The maximum debt nancing cost
 
 b + b

is 0.82% of debt proceeds, lower than average
debt issuance cost in Altinkihc and Hansen (2000).
2.3 Tests for Debt servicing Costs Predictions
2.3.1 Data Construction
This section illustrates the construction of each measure for my cross-sectional studies.
Debt Conservatism Measure
To strengthen my models prediction on conservative debt policy, I calculate a direct debt
conservatism measure based on the use of interest tax shields. I follow Bloulin, Core and
Guay (2011)s approach to construct Graham (2000)s debt conservatism measure. I dene a
kinkas the rst interest payment increment at which the rm has a decline in its marginal
tax rate (at least 50 basis points). Therefore, a higher debt conservatism measure implies
more conservative debt policy. The marginal tax rates (MTR) are estimated by deducting
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various increments of the current interest payments from the taxable income, and the kink
is the increment of interest expense immediately before which results in the computed MTR
drop by at least 50 basis points. I follow the interest deduction schedule of Graham (2000); I
add the following increments of current interest payments to before-nancing taxable income:
0%; 20%; 40%; 60%; 80%; 100%; 120%; 160%; 200%; 300%; 400%; 500%; 600%; 700%; and
800%. The income before tax is dened as follows:
EBIT+Special Items(SPI)
- Deferred Tax Expense (TXDC) /max. statutory tax rate
+Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations (XIDO)/(1-max. statutory tax rate),
where the symbols in parenthesis refer to the items in CRSP/Compustat merged database.
I simulate future interest expenses based on the changes in the interest coverage ratio.
So long as income at t is positive, future interest is changed by the ratio of income at t to
income at t   1. If income at t is negative, I hold interest expenses constant for that year
(i.e., interest expenses at time t = 0 is equal to interest expenses at time t  1). In terms of
past interest deductions, the interest expenses in historical taxable income is retroactively
adjusted. For example, when estimating the MTR at the 50% interest deduction increment
at time t, I assume that interest deductions in periods t n to t  1 are set to 50% of actual.
I do not incorporate the state tax rate and alternative minimum tax rate by following
the approach of Bloulin et al. (2011). They mainly point out the consistency problem in
the application of alternative minium tax rate. I reect the historical carry backward and
forward changes into my simulation as well.
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Convex Capital Adjustment Costs
To analyze the implications of convex capital adjustment costs on capital structure choice,
I rst calculate a rm level convex adjustment cost estimate by using a modied version
of Tobins q regression. Similar to Eberlys (1997) approach, I regress a rms investment-
asset ratio on Tobins q, operating prots, and the investment good price for each rm,
but only when the rms investment is positive. The operating prot term is introduced
to capture the e¤ect of nancing constraints, as in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
This inclusion is in line with an important role of external nancing costs in my model. To
capture non-convexity in capital expenditure, the regression is only conducted for positive
investment rm-year observations. The regression model is summarized as follows:
I
K
= 0 + 1Tobins q + 2prot+3investment good price+ " for I > 0: (2.4)
After assignment of the rm level convex capital adjustment cost estimate, I drop rms
with negative capital adjustment costs because the quantitative predictions only hold for
the positive costs region. Each rm is grouped by its two digit SIC code rst, and then it is
categorized into convex capital adjustment cost quartiles within its industry group. Since the
convex capital adjustment cost is inversely related to 1, the rms in the rst quartile have
the highest convex capital adjustment cost estimates and the rms in the fourth quartile
have the lowest ones.
Fixed Operating Costs
To construct xed operating cost measure, I adopt a modied version of the estimation
method used in Kahl et al. (2012). For this purpose, I rstly generate ex-ante expectations
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in which Si;t and Xi;t indicate an individual rm i0s sales and operating costs at time t,








where Si;t and 
X
i;t point to the innovation of sales growth and operating cost growth, respec-
tively. To obtain a reliable estimate of xed operating costs, I run the following regression
for the rms with at least 12 years of observations in the sample period:
Xi;t = FCi
S
i;t + "i;t (2.7)
where FCi is an individual rms xed operating cost measure. This 12 year restriction
potentially relieves outlier problems from a limited horizon of observations. FCi reects the
sensitivity of operating cost growth to sales growth after taking account of growth trends.
Higher proportions of xed costs to total operating costs will show a lower sensitivity and
consequently a lower estimate of FCi: Conversely, a higher estimate of FCi indicates more
variable costs relative to total costs. Then I introduce dummy variables indicating high and
low xed operating costs rms. The high xed operating cost dummy variable is one if the
cost measure is in the rst quartile and zero otherwise. The low xed operating cost dummy
variable takes one if the cost measure is in the fourth quartile and zero, otherwise.
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Prot Volatility
To construct a natural measure of prot volatility, I calculate the standard deviation of
operating prots for each rm that stays at least 12 years in the sample period. This
restriction potentially relieves outlier problems from young rms. Then I generate dummy
variables indicating high and low prot volatility rms. The high prot volatility indicator
variable takes the value of 1 if the standard deviation is in the fourth quartile. The low prot
volatility indicator variable is equal to 1 if the standard deviation is in the rst quartile.
Future Investment Demands
For the measurement of expected future investment needs, I construct indicator variables
based on actual future capital expenditures. The use of indicator variables helps relieve a
potential measurement error problem stemming from the use of actual future investments
as explanatory variables. Unexpectedly great or poor investment opportunities in the next
period a¤ect actual future investment demands and the use of indicator variables partially
lters out such unexpected components by covering a wide range of actual investments.
To construct dummy variables indicating large and small future investment, I rst cal-
culate the ranking of the investment-asset ratio for each rm-year observation relative to all
of the rminvestment-asset ratios in the sample periods. Then I categorize each rm-year
observation into a quartile corresponding to its investment-asset ratio ranking. The indicator
variable for large future investment takes one if a rms next period investment-asset ratio
is in the fourth quartile, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the small investment dummy takes
one if a rms next period investment-asset ratio is in the rst quartile, and zero otherwise.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics : Convex Capital Adjustment Cost Quartile
Observations Equity Freq. Leverage Cash Prot Conservatism
Panel A: All Firms
1st Quartile 6415 0.2023 0.2015 0.1817 0.0909 2.9844
2nd Quartile 6303 0.1988 0.2113 0.1668 0.0924 2.6283
3rd Quartile 6268 0.1903 0.2399 0.1415 0.0805 2.05
4th Quartile 5307 0.1577 0.2726 0.1225 0.0873 1.5757
Panel B: Non High-tech Firms
1st Quartile 4555 0.1488 0.2349 0.1182 0.1204 3.1229
2nd Quartile 4541 0.144 0.2406 0.1059 0.1202 2.6877
3rd Quartile 4658 0.1453 0.2634 0.0951 0.1139 2.2295
4th Quartile 3900 0.1131 0.3052 0.0781 0.1152 1.6128
Panel C:High-tech Firms
1st Quartile 1860 0.3333 0.1196 0.3373 0.0186 2.6232
2nd Quartile 1762 0.34 0.1356 0.3238 0.0207 2.4677
3rd Quartile 1610 0.3205 0.1718 0.2756 -0.0159 1.5127
4th Quartile 1407 0.2814 0.1823 0.2455 0.0099 1.4689
This table reports a variety of summary statistics for all rms, high-tech rms and non-high-
tech rms according to convex capital adjustment cost quartiles. Only the rms with at least
12 rm-year observations are included in the calculations. Firms are included in the high-
tech category if their rst three digit SIC code is 283, 357, 366, 382, 384, and 737, and all
other rms are all in non high-tech category. All values are averaged except the number of
observations. The variable construction is illustrated in Appendix A.
2.3.2 Convex Capital Adjustment Costs
This section analyzes the inuence of convex capital adjustment costs on a rms capital
structure policies. As shown in Chapter 1, higher convex capital adjustment costs lead to
large costs in asset sales, which raise the marginal value of liquidity and debt servicing costs.
To investigate the role of convex capital adjustment costs on capital structure policies, I
adopt the quartile capital adjustment costs indicator variables, constructed in the previous
section. I cross-sectionally investigate the relationship between these indicator variables and
capital structure policies.
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for each convex capital adjustment cost quartile
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category. The table documents the average of leverage ratio, debt conservatism, cash holding,
and operating prots. The frequency of equity nancing is also reported. The table considers
only the rms with at least 12 observations during the sample period, which provides a more
reliable convex capital adjustment cost estimate. High-tech and non high-tech sub-categories
are introduced to examine whether the overall summary statistics results stem from high-
tech industries, which are well known for low leverage and frequent equity nancing (Hall
2002).
Table 2.3 indicates more conservative debt policy and frequent equity nancing in high
convex capital adjustment cost rms. Even though each category has stable average prof-
itability, high convex capital adjustment cost rms tend to have low leverage ratios and large
debt conservatism measures. The average leverage ratio is 0.2015 in the rst quartile and
rises to 0.2726 in the fourth quartile. Similarly, the debt conservatism measure decreases
from 2.98 to 1.58 in response to the same quartile variation. The rms with higher convex
capital adjustment costs also use equity nancing more frequently. The equity nancing
frequency is 20% in the rst quartile and decreases to 15% in the fourth quartile. The
sub-categorization of high-tech and non high-tech industry does not inuence the qualitative
predictions from convex capital adjustment costs quartile variations.
Table 2.4 investigates the relationship between convex capital adjustment cost quartile
dummies and external nancing policies in cross-sectional regression models. The leverage
ratio, debt conservatism measure, and binary decisions of equity nancing are used as the
left-hand side variables. On the right hand side, I employ the convex capital adjustment
cost quartile dummies and a set of widely used rm characteristics as control variables. The
control variables include the logged book asset values, asset tangibility, market to book ratio,
R&D expenditure, R&D activity and industry median leverage ratio, as suggested in Frank
and Goyal (2008). I also introduce the 3-year stock return in the equity nancing analysis
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Table 2.4: Cross-sectional Analysis : Convex Capital Adjustment Cost Quartile
Leverage Conservatism Equity
M/B ratio -0.0141 -0.0116 0.5452 0.5139 0.4062 0.4092
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
logAsset 0.0133 0.0147 0.4685 0.4530 -0.0471 -0.0551 -0.0460
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangibility 0.1679 0.1452 -1.5290 -1.2773 0.3224 0.4326 0.3146
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005)
Protability -0.2021 -0.2042 6.2191 6.2274 -3.1357 -2.8459 -3.1450
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D expenditure -0.1814 -0.2004 0.3535 0.5980 1.5282 3.9500 1.4838
(0.000) (0.000) (0.307) (0.081) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D dummy -0.0191 -0.0180 -0.3712 -0.3959 0.1281 0.1585 0.1368
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.002) (0.009)
Med. Industry Leverage 0.2066 0.2452 -3.2308 -3.6798 0.2148 -0.8196 0.2445
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.513) (0.013) (0.461)
Convex Cost: 1st Quartile -0.0540 0.5956 0.2938 -0.0350
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.591)
Convex Cost: 2nd Quartile -0.0478 0.4833 0.3188 0.1064
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087)
Convex Cost: 3rd Quartile -0.0286 0.1277 0.2694 0.1284
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.036)
Stock Return(3year) 0.2238 0.3685 0.2234
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.1206 0.1434 -0.3888 -0.5595 -2.5248 -2.2340 -2.5928
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 24293 24293 22301 22301 22119 22119 22119
Adjusted R2 0.1544 0.1634 0.3016 0.3071
Pseudo R2 0.1785 0.1429 0.1791
This table reports coe¢ cients, p-values (in parenthesis) and adjusted (pseudo-) R2 from cross sec-
tional regression and logit models. The leverage ratio, debt conservatism measure, and binary
choice of equity issuance (logit) are used as dependent variables. Several control variables and
convex capital adjustment cost quartile dummies are used as independent variables. The construc-
tion of controlling variables is explained in Appendix A. Only the rms with at least 12 rm-year
observations are included in the estimation. The standard errors of the regressions are robust to
heteroscedasticity.
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to capture the market timing aspect of equity nancing. I use the ordinary least squares
method in the leverage and debt conservatism measure analysis and adopt a logit model for
the binary choice of equity issuance decisions.
As expected, rms with higher convex capital adjustment costs exercise more conservative
debt policy. Even after controlling for the rm characteristics, the quartile dummies show a
monotonic relation with the leverage ratio and debt conservatism measure. Convex capital
adjustment costs are negatively correlated with the leverage ratio and positively correlated
with the debt conservatism measure.
The logit regression results partially support more frequent equity nancing in large
convex capital adjustment cost rms. Without inclusion of the market to book ratio, higher
convex capital adjustment cost dummies are positively and almost monotonically correlated
with equity issuance decisions. Yet, the inclusion of the market to book ratio drastically
changes the coe¢ cients of quartile dummies, especially for the rms with the largest convex
capital adjustment cost estimates.
The drastic changes of quartile coe¢ cients in the logit model are probably related to
the information of the market to book ratio captured in the convex capital adjustment
cost dummies. In the estimation of rm level convex capital adjustment costs, I use a
rms Tobins q value as an independent variable, which is a modication of the market to
book ratio. The market to book variation may directly reect more signicant information
regarding equity nancing decisions.
To summarize, rms with higher convex capital adjustment costs tend to use debt more
conservatively and equity nancing more frequently, even after considering industry and
other rm characteristics. Both of the summary statistics and regression analysis results
generally conrm these tendencies. These ndings are consistent with the debt servicing
cost predictions in Chapter 1.
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2.3.3 Fixed Operating Costs
This section analyzes the relationship between xed operating costs and a rms capital
structure policies. In the previous chapter, I quantitatively showed large xed operating
costs are closely associated with low leverage ratios and frequent equity nancing activities.
Higher xed operating costs raise the marginal value of liquidity and consequently drive large
debt servicing costs. To analyze the implications of higher xed operating costs on nancing
policies, I use the indicator variables constructed in the previous section and cross-sectionally
analyze the relationship between these dummy variables and capital structure choices.
Table 2.3 reports summary statics results according to the xed operating costs indicator
variables. The table documents the average of leverage ratio, debt conservatism, cash hold-
ing, and operating prots. The equity nancing frequency is also included. The summary
statistics are calculated for di¤erent sub-categories such as high-tech industry, non high-tech
industries, young rms and old rms. I examine the high-tech category to capture the in-
uence of human capital intensive rms, well known for low leverage and frequent equity
nancing (Hall 2002). The young-old rm categories are also included because younger rms
tend to maintain lower leverage and issue equity more frequently (Frank and Goyal 2003).
In line with the debt servicing cost predictions, higher xed operating costs rms are
closely associated with low leverage and frequent equity nancing. Conversely, lower xed
operating costs rms show higher leverage ratios and inactive equity issuance activities. For
instance, the average leverage ratio for the low xed operating costs rms is 0.2705 but
decreases to 0.1657 for the high xed operating costs rms. Equity nancing frequency is
10% for the low xed operating costs rms but becomes 28% for the high xed operating costs
rms. These qualitative predictions remain unchanged for the sub-categories of high-tech,
non-high-tech, young rms, and old rms.
However, the relationship between xed operating costs and the debt conservatism mea-
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics : Fixed Operating Costs
Equity Leverage Cash Prot Conservatism
Panel A : All Firms
Low Fixed Operating Costs 0.1157 0.2705 0.0848 0.1407 3.0547
Others 0.148 0.2214 0.1383 0.1139 2.555
High Fixed Operating Costs . 0.3871 0.1657 0.3227 -0.0632 1.1718
Panel B: Old Firm-Year Observation
Low Fixed Operating Costs 0.0823 0.2788 0.0717 0.1375 3.0597
Others 0.102 0.2217 0.1298 0.1121 2.6731
High Fixed Operating Costs . 0.3021 0.1778 0.2923 -0.0334 1.3962
Panel C: Young Firm-Year Observation
Low Fixed Operating Costs 0.3021 0.1778 0.2923 -0.0334 1.3962
Others 0.1874 0.2527 0.113 0.1476 3.0418
High Fixed Operating Costs . 0.2302 0.2208 0.1535 0.117 2.2994
Panel D: Non High-tech Firms
Low Fixed Operating Costs 0.1007 0.289 0.0665 0.1423 2.8906
Others 0.1231 0.2469 0.1049 0.1217 2.5717
High Fixed Operating Costs . 0.3017 0.2105 0.2017 0.008 1.0805
Panel E : High-tech Firms
Low Fixed Operating Costs 0.2055 0.1599 0.1948 0.1313 4.105
Others 0.2219 0.1454 0.2378 0.0905 2.5045
High Fixed Operating Costs . 0.4484 0.1335 0.4095 -0.1143 1.2388
This table reports a variety of summary statistics for all rms, young-rm year old-rm year, high-
tech rms and non-high-tech rms according to xed operating costs dummies. Young rm-year
observation indicates all rms that stay less than 12 years in CRSP/Compustat database or the
rst 12 rm-year observations for the rms that stay more than 12 years in the database. The other
descriptions are identical to those of Table 2.3
sure is not well aligned with the debt servicing cost predictions. Higher xed operating
costs rms rather use debt more aggressively than lower xed operating costs rms do. For
instance, the average debt conservatism measure for the high xed operating costs rms is
1.17 but increases to 3.0 for the low xed operating costs rms. This contradictory pattern
appears closely associated with the quite low protability in the high xed operating cost
category rms. Even with low leverage ratios, lower protability induces a signicant drop
in debt conservatism measure, which points to more aggressive use of interest tax shields for
56
these rms. This correlation between the xed operating cost dummy variables and prof-
itability suggests a potential measurement problem in Kahl et al. (2012)s xed operating
cost estimation.
Table 2.6 analyzes cross-sectional correlations between the xed operating cost dummy
variables and capital structure choice. All regression and logit model specications are
identical to those of Table 2.4, except the inclusion of the xed operating cost indicator
variables replacing the convex capital adjustment cost dummies. The book asset value in
logs, tangibility, market to book ratio, R&D expenditure, R&D activity and industry median
leverage ratio are used as control variables in regressions. The logit model incorporates 3-year
stock returns to capture market timing aspects of equity nancing.
My ndings in cross-sectional models are consistent to the summary statics results in
Table 2.5. The high xed operating cost indicator variable is associated with lower leverage
ratios and more frequent equity nancing activities. Conversely, the low xed operating
cost dummy variable is correlated positively with leverage ratios and negatively with equity
nancing frequencies. Yet, an increase in xed operating costs is still negatively related
with the measure of debt conservatism, which is inconsistent with the debt servicing cost
predictions.
The summary statistics results and regression analyses all conrm the validity of the debt
servicing costs predictions in terms of leverage ratios and equity nancing frequencies. Higher
xed operating cost rms maintain lower leverage ratios and use equity more frequently.
These results are also consistent with the empirical work of Kahl et al. (2012); their xed
operating cost measure is negatively correlated with leverage ratios and positively associated
with equity issues. Yet, my results on the debt conservatism measure are not well aligned
with the debt servicing cost predictions. The xed operating measure used in prior literature
appears to generate a tendency for selecting lower protability rms as high xed operating
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Table 2.6: Cross-sectional Analysis : Fixed Operating Costs
Leverage Conservatism Equity
M/B ratio -0.0138 -0.0129 0.5549 0.5685 0.3826 0.3602
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
logAsset 0.0144 0.0131 0.4348 0.4160 -0.0751 -0.0538
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangibility 0.1830 0.1872 -1.8210 -1.7738 0.3631 0.2592
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Protability -0.2120 -0.2265 6.7393 6.5343 -3.2067 -2.8903
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D expenditure -0.2586 -0.2289 1.0636 1.4765 1.6668 1.1899
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D dummy -0.0151 -0.0127 -0.4344 -0.4024 0.0786 0.0367
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.364)
Med. Industry Leverage 0.1692 0.1612 -2.8942 -3.0239 0.3355 0.4715
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.197) (0.074)
Low Fixed Operating Costs 0.0095 0.1650 -0.1164
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
High Fixed Operating Costs -0.0311 -0.4180 0.4989
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Return (3year) 0.2441 0.2459
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.1175 0.1251 -0.2205 -0.1146 -2.4266 -2.5651
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000)
N 41399 41399 38000 38000 37709 37709
Adjusted R2 0.1726 0.1758 0.3049 0.3074
Pseudo R2 0.1746 0.1791
This table reports coe¢ cients, p-values (in parenthesis) and adjusted (pseudo-) R2 from
cross sectional regression and logit models. The leverage ratio, debt conservatism measure,
and binary choice of equity issuance (logit) are used as dependent variables. Several control
variables and the indicator variables for future investment demands are used as indepen-
dent variables. The construction of controlling variables is explained in Appendix A. The




This section cross-sectionally investigates how the volatility of prot generation a¤ects a
rms capital structure choice. Given the same protability state, a highly volatile operating
prot implies a greater likelihood of lower protability states in the future. As analyzed in
Chapter 1, such higher likelihoods of lower protability states indicate a higher marginal
value of liquidity in the future, which induces an expectation of large debt servicing costs
in current debt issues. To examine the implications of prot volatilities, I use indicator
variables for high and low prot volatility rms developed in the previous section.
Table 2.7 shows summary statics results in accordance with the prot volatility indica-
tors. The table describes the average of leverage ratio, debt conservatism, cash holding,
and operating prots. The equity nancing frequency is also documented. The summary
statistics are reported for di¤erent sub-categories such as high-tech industry, non high-tech
industries, young rms and old rms. I include the high-tech category to capture the in-
uence of human capital intensive rms, well known for low leverage and frequent equity
nancing (Hall 2002). The young-old rm categories are also included because younger rms
tend to maintain lower leverage and issue equity more frequently (Frank and Goyal 2003).
Consistent with the debt servicing cost predictions, rms with highly volatile prots are
closely associated with low leverage ratios and active equity nancing. Conversely, rms with
low prot volatility are closely connected with higher leverage ratios and a lower frequency
of equity nancing. For instance, the average leverage ratio for the low prot volatility
rms is 0.2931 but drops to 0.1721 for the high prot volatility rms. The equity nancing
frequency is 0.0967 but increases to 0.3706 in response to the same rm category changes.
These qualitative predictions remain stable for the sub-categories of high-tech, non-high-tech,
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Table 2.7: Summary Statistics : Prot Volatility
Equity Leverage Cash Prot Conservatism
Panel A : All Firms
Low Prot Volatility 0.0967 0.2931 0.0634 0.1313 2.8711
Others 0.1385 0.2129 0.1456 0.1315 2.821
High Prot Volatility . 0.3706 0.1721 0.2848 -0.0474 1.1134
Panel B: Old Firm-Year Observation
Low Prot Volatility 0.0734 0.2962 0.0582 0.1303 2.8959
Others 0.0909 0.2104 0.1354 0.1286 2.9383
High Prot Volatility . 0.3706 0.1721 0.2848 -0.0474 1.1134
Panel C: Young Firm-Year Observation
Low Prot Volatility 0.1658 0.2839 0.0788 0.1342 2.7812
Others 0.2169 0.2171 0.1623 0.1363 2.5867
High Prot Volatility . 0.4382 0.1633 0.3019 -0.0603 1.047
Panel D: Non High-tech Firms
Low Prot Volatility 0.0971 0.3032 0.0555 0.1287 2.7336
Others 0.1117 0.2397 0.1064 0.1365 2.7523
High Prot Volatility . 0.2957 0.2104 0.1945 0.0204 1.2212
Panel E : High-tech Firms
Low Prot Volatility 0.0935 0.1983 0.1375 0.1562 4.177
Others 0.2147 0.1365 0.2571 0.1172 3.0218
High Prot Volatility . 0.4356 0.1389 0.3632 -0.1062 1.0185
This table reports a variety of summary statistics for all rms, young-rm year old-rm year, high-
tech rms and non-high-tech rms according to xed operating costs dummies. Young rm-year
observation indicates all rms that stay less than 12 years in CRSP/Compustat database or the
rst 12 rm-year observations for the rms that stay more than 12 years in the database. The other
descriptions are identical to those of Table 2.3
young rms, and old rms.
Yet, the debt conservatism measure shows a distinctive pattern. The rms with highly
volatile prots rather use debt more aggressively than the rms with low prot volatility
do. For example, the average debt conservatism measure for the rms with highly volatile
prots is 1.11 but increases to 2.87 for their low volatility counterparts. Similar to the result
of xed operating costs, this contradictory pattern seems to be closely related with the quite
low protability for the higher prot volatility rms. In spite of lower leverage ratios, lower
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protability leads to more aggressive use of tax benets.
Table 2.8 cross-sectionally investigates how the prot volatility indicator variables are
correlated with a rms capital structure choices. All regression and logit model specica-
tions are identical to those of Table 2.4, except the inclusion of the volatility dummy variables
replacing the convex capital adjustment cost dummies. The book asset value in logs, tangi-
bility, market to book ratio, R&D expenditure, R&D activity and industry median leverage
ratio are placed as control variables in regressions. The logit model incorporates 3-year stock
returns to capture market timing aspects of equity nancing.
The cross-sectional correlations are in line with the summary statics results in Table 2.7.
The indicator variable for lower prot volatility shows a positive correlation with leverage
ratios and a negative correlation with the frequency of equity nancing. This low prot
volatility variable is also negatively associated with the debt conservatismmeasure, consistent
with the debt servicing cost predictions. The indicator variable for higher prot volatility
is negatively associated with leverage ratios and positively associated with equity nancing
activities even after controlling for other rm characteristics. Yet, this high volatility variable
is negatively correlated with the debt conservatism measure pointing to more aggressive use
of tax benets.
These nding are well aligned with the debt servicing costs predictions on capital struc-
ture policies, as proposed in Chapter 1. Low prot volatility rms maintain higher leverage
ratios, exercise more aggressive debt policy and issue equity less frequently, consistent with
the debt servicing costs predictions. High prot volatility rms show lower leverage ratios
and more frequent equity nancing activities, as expected in the debt servicing costs analy-
sis. Yet, the debt conservatism measure is negatively related with the indicator variable of
highly volatile prots, which argues against the debt servicing cost predictions. A potential
association between lower prot generations and higher prot variations may be behind more
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Table 2.8: Cross-sectional Analysis : Prot Volatility
Leverage Conservatism Equity
M/B ratio -0.0138 -0.0133 0.5549 0.5764 0.3826 0.3470
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
logAsset 0.0144 0.0124 0.4348 0.4082 -0.0751 -0.0156
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.083)
Tangibility 0.1830 0.1795 -1.8210 -1.8596 0.3631 0.4681
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Protability -0.2120 -0.2108 6.7393 6.3964 -3.2067 -2.7220
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D expenditure -0.2586 -0.2519 1.0636 1.4608 1.6668 1.2204
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D dummy -0.0151 -0.0141 -0.4344 -0.4292 0.0786 0.0584
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.150)
Med. Industry Leverage 0.1692 0.1554 -2.8942 -2.7789 0.3355 0.3788
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.197) (0.150)
Low Prot Volatility 0.0219 -0.1309 -0.1452
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
High Prot Volatility -0.0037 -0.6321 0.7068
(0.187) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Return (3year) 0.2441 0.2446
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.1175 0.1253 -0.2205 0.0714 -2.4266 -2.9100
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.000)
N 41399 41399 38000 38000 37709 37709
Adjusted R2 0.1726 0.1745 0.3049 0.3094
Pseudo R2 0.1746 0.1838
This table reports coe¢ cients, p-values (in parenthesis) and adjusted (pseudo-) R2
from cross sectional regression and logit models. The leverage ratio, debt conservatism
measure, and binary choice of equity issuance (logit) are used as dependent variables.
Several control variables and the indicator variables for future investment demands are
used as independent variables. The construction of controlling variables is explained in
Appendix A. The standard errors of the regressions are robust to heteroscedasticity.
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Table 2.9: Summary Statistics : Future Investment Demands
Equity Leverage Cash Prot Conservatism
Panel A : All Firms
Small Future Investment 0.1995 0.2555 0.174 0.0257 1.8741
Others 0.2404 0.2379 0.1705 0.0416 2.1588
Large Future Investment 0.2942 0.188 0.197 0.0905 2.8486
Panel B: Old Firm-Year Observation
Small Future Investment 0.1024 0.259 0.1307 0.0819 2.2973
Others 0.1196 0.2358 0.1286 0.0979 2.5487
Large Future Investment 0.1606 0.1888 0.1542 0.1321 3.2632
Panel C: Young Firm-Year Observation
Small Future Investment 0.2843 0.2524 0.2118 -0.0233 1.3488
Others 0.3372 0.2395 0.2041 -0.0036 1.7167
Large Future Investment 0.4005 0.1874 0.231 0.0573 2.3345
Panel D: Non High-tech Firms
Small Future Investment 0.1497 0.2969 0.1077 0.0667 1.9137
Others 0.1859 0.2735 0.1094 0.084 2.2437
Large Future Investment 0.2367 0.221 0.1333 0.126 2.9502
Panel E : High-tech Firms
Small Future Investment 0.3194 0.1556 0.3336 -0.0731 1.7712
Others 0.3692 0.1539 0.3149 -0.0588 1.9492
Large Future Investment 0.4326 0.1086 0.3504 0.005 2.595
This table reports a variety of summary statistics for all rms, young-rm year old-rm year,
high-tech rms and non-high-tech rms according to future investment dummies. Young rm-year
observation indicates all rms that stay less than 12 years in CRSP/Compustat database or the
rst 12 rm-year observations for the rms that stay more than 12 years in the database. The other
descriptions are identical to those of Table 2.3
aggressive debt policy for the rms with highly volatile prots.
2.3.5 Future Investment Demands
This section analyzes how future investment demands inuence current external nancing
policies. Large future investments increase the marginal value of liquidity, after controlling
for a rms operating prots. By similar reasoning, small future investment demands are
closely associated with low debt servicing costs.
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Table 2.9 documents summary statistics results according to the future investment in-
dicator variables. The table reports the average of leverage ratio, debt conservatism, cash
holding, and operating prots. The equity nancing frequency is also documented. The
summary statistics are calculated for di¤erent sub-categories such as high-tech industry, non
high-tech industries, young rms and old rms. I introduce the high-tech category to capture
the inuence of human capital intensive rms, well known for low leverage and frequent eq-
uity nancing (Hall 2002). The young-old rm categories are also examined because younger
rms tend to maintain lower leverage and use equity nancing more frequently (Frank and
Goyal 2003).
Consistent with debt servicing cost predictions, rms with large future investment are
closely associated with low leverage, conservative debt policy and frequent equity nancing
despite higher protability levels. Conversely, rms with small future investment are cor-
related with higher leverage, less conservative debt policy and infrequent equity nancing,
in spite of lower protability levels. For instance, the average leverage ratio is 0.255 for
rms with small future investment but 0.188 for rms with large future investment. Equity
nancing frequency is 29.5% for the rms with large future investments but 20% for the
rms with large future investments. The qualitative predictions remain unchanged for the
sub-categories of high-tech, non-high-tech, young rms and old rms.
Table 2.10 investigates the relationship between future investment demands and current
capital structure choice in cross-sectional regression models. All regression and logit model
specications are identical to those of Table 2.4, except the inclusion of the future investment
indicator variables replacing the convex capital adjustment cost dummies. The book asset
value in logs, tangibility, market to book ratio, R&D expenditure, R&D activity and indus-
try median leverage ratio are still used as control variables. The 3-year stock returns are
additionally incorporated in the logit model for equity nancing to capture market timing
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Table 2.10: Cross-sectional Analysis : Future Investment Demands
Leverage Conservatism Equity
M/B ratio -0.0123 -0.0109 0.5165 0.5021 0.3817 0.3787
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
logAsset 0.0132 0.0128 0.4471 0.4531 -0.0957 -0.0929
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangibility 0.1962 0.1960 -1.5715 -1.5768 0.3105 0.3019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Protability -0.1705 -0.1590 4.8101 4.6862 -2.7986 -2.8409
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D expenditure -0.2235 -0.2187 0.3566 0.3005 1.1381 1.1148
(0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.085) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D dummy -0.0357 -0.0359 -0.3048 -0.3045 0.0719 0.0729
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.038)
Med. Industry Leverage 0.1909 0.1971 -3.1396 -3.2056 0.3318 0.3110
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.121) (0.146)
Small Future Investment 0.0112 -0.2198 -0.1536
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Large Future Investment -0.0372 0.2920 0.1026
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Stock Return (3year) 0.2204 0.2124
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.1305 0.1322 -0.1542 -0.1265 -2.1701 -2.1362
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
N 58143 58143 47481 47481 46914 46914
Adjusted R2 0.1653 0.1708 0.2972 0.3000
Pseudo R2 0.1906 0.1915
This table reports coe¢ cients, p-values (in parenthesis) and adjusted (pseudo-) R2 from
cross sectional regression and logit models. The leverage ratio, debt conservatism mea-
sure, and binary choice of equity issuance (logit) are used as dependent variables. Several
control variables and the indicator variables for future investment demands are used as
independent variables. The construction of controlling variables is explained in Appendix
A. The standard errors of the regressions are robust to heteroscedasticity.
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aspects.
The cross-sectional results are consistent with the debt servicing cost predictions devel-
oped in the previous chapter. The rms with large future investment are closely associated
with low leverage, conservative debt policy and frequent equity nancing, even after con-
trolling for other rm characteristics. The small future investment dummy is negatively
related with the leverage ratio, and positively related with the debt conservatism measure
and equity nancing, as expected. All coe¢ cients are highly signicant and the signs of
these coe¢ cients are in line with the debt servicing cost predictions.
The coe¢ cients of investment dummies in equity nancing regression contradict the pre-
dictions of the standard trade-o¤models. The standard trade-o¤theory predicts less frequent
equity nancing for rms with conservative debt policy and high protability. Yet, the rms
with large future investment use equity nancing more frequently in spite of their conserva-
tive use of debt and large operating prots. The rms with small investment are reluctant
to issue equity despite low protability and large debt obligations, which also argues against
the standard trade-o¤ theory predictions.
The regression analysis for the leverage ratio provides an interesting result to the puzzling
negative correlation between leverage ratio and protability (Frank and Goyal 2008). The in-
troduction of investment dummy variables slightly weakens the negative correlation between
protability and leverage ( 0:1705 !  0:1590) and the change is statistically signicantly
at 95% level.1 The debt conservatism analysis shows a similar change of the protability
coe¢ cient, which suggests the weaker correlation is not a mere coincidence. Debt servic-
ing costs considerations appear to have some explanatory power in resolving the puzzling
negative correlation between protability and leverage ratio.
In summary, the relationship between future investment and current capital structure
1The p-value is not reported here.
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choices is consistent with the debt servicing cost predictions. Large future investment de-
mands are closely associated with currently lower leverage and more frequent equity issuance.
Equity nancing behaviors in both small and large future investment rms contradict the
standard trade-o¤ theory predictions. The inclusion of investment variables weakens the
negative correlation between protability and leverage ratio.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter empirically supports the theoretical analysis on debt servicing costs in the
previous chapter. In the rst half of this chapter, I studied the statistical property of the
simulated method of moment estimator and investigated a detailed identication procedure
used for the calibration of the baseline model in Chapter 1.
In the second half of this chapter, I empirically conrmed the validity of debt servicing
costs predictions for public U.S. rms. I proposed that large debt servicing costs are closely
associated with low leverage ratios and frequent equity nancing activities in the previous
chapter. I conducted four cross-sectional studies to test these empirical predictions from
large debt servicing costs. The e¤ects of convex capital adjustment costs, xed operating
costs, future investment demands and the volatility of prots on capital structure policies
are analyzed in the second half.
All of the four empirical studies argue for the debt servicing cost predictions on capital
structure policies. Firms with high convex capital adjustment costs, high xed operating
costs, large future investment needs, and highly volatile prots are all negatively correlated
with leverage ratios and positively correlated with equity nancing frequencies. These corre-
lations results are all consistent with the debt servicing costs predictions on capital structure
policies.
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These ndings also provide new insights on empirical regularities. Especially, rms ex-
pecting large future investment demands use equity frequently, in spite of their higher prof-
itability level and large unused interest tax shields, contradictory to the standard trade-o¤
theory predictions. This correlation between future investment and protability also weak-
ens the puzzling negative correlation between leverage ratio and protability (Frank and
Goyal 2008). The analysis on convex capital adjustment costs is also closely associated with
lower leverage and frequent equity nancing activities in human capital intensive rms (Hall
2003). The results from xed operating costs are consistent with the empirical ndings of
Kahl et al. (2012) as well.
This cross-sectional analysis also provides lucrative future research directions. Even
though my cross-sectional results are all well aligned with the debt servicing cost predic-
tions, other empirical approaches resolving endogeniety issues will strengthen the validity of
the debt servicing cost predictions. Furthermore, this analysis on the debt servicing cost pre-
dictions could be extended internationally. This liquidity consideration on capital structure
policy is quite general to be tested for a di¤erent group of countries.
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Chapter 3
Macroeconomic Conditions and Capital Structure
Dynamics
3.1 Introduction
The nancial crisis of 2008 rea¢ rms that economic contractions critically a¤ect an individual
rms investment needs, prots, and external nancing conditions altogether. Practitioners
widely recognize these macroeconomic conditions as key determinants in their nancing
policies. A primary goal of chief nancial o¢ cers is to maintain nancial exibility, so they
do not need to shrink their business in downturns (Graham and Harvey 2001). Financially
constrained rms, indeed, cut their investments sharply and had substantial di¢ culties to
access external nancing markets in the nancial crisis of 2008 (Campello, Graham, and
Harvey 2011).
Yet, little theoretical inquiry explores how these simultaneous changes in investment
needs, protability, and external nancing conditions shape the cyclical variations of capital
structure policies. Indeed, research to date has largely ignored the following related ques-
tions: What factors drive empirically observed counter-cyclical debt policy and pro-cyclical
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equity issues? How do investment dynamics inuence the issuance of debt and equity? How
does a large value of liquidity in economic downturns change debt policies during economic
upturns? What are the implications of stochastic external nancing conditions on capital
structure dynamics?
I develop and estimate a new dynamic corporate model with macroeconomic conditions
to address these questions. My model builds on recent dynamic trade-o¤ models with pre-
cautionary cash holding (Lee 2013; Gamba and Triantis 2008), mainly by adding macro-
economic protability and nancing cost shocks. A rm makes investment, cash retention,
capital structure, and payout decisions. Both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic protability
shocks a¤ect the rms prot generations in persistent ways. Macroeconomic conditions also
inuence the rms external nancing costs, which create the precautionary value of liquid-
ity. Capital accumulation and resale are not perfectly exible due to the organizational costs
involved in investment decisions in my model.
Pro-cyclical protability, investment dynamics, and stochastic external nancing costs are
all pivotal in the capital structure dynamics. Lower protability in downturns contributes
to counter-cyclical debt policy in a couple of ways. First, low operating prot generations
directly limit the use of internal funds for aggressive debt retirements in economic downturns.
Second, such lower protability raises the marginal value of liquidity in contractions, leading
to active debt retirements and restrained debt issues in economic upturns. Servicing debt
obligations drains a rms valuable liquidity and hence creates a liquidity cost associated
with debt, i.e., debt servicing costs(Bolton, Chen and Wang 2014; Lee 2013). To avoid
large liquidity costs of debt during economic downturns, a manager has strong incentives
to retire debt with ample operating prots, and to optimally limit debt issuance during
economic upturns.
Next, investment dynamics drive the issuance of external debt and equity. In order to
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fund larger investment needs, a manager relies more heavily on external debt and equity
issuance, ceteris paribus. The joint realization of prots and investment demands critically
inuences capital structure dynamics, unlike the standard trade-o¤ theory predictions that
focus primarily on protability. This investment demand possibly induces active debt issues
during economic downturns, which also contributes to counter-cyclical debt policy.
Counter-cyclical equity nancing costs lead to pro-cyclical equity issues, and more counter-
cyclical debt nancing policy. A higher equity nancing cost drives additional debt issues at
external nancing margins in economic downturns. It also raises the marginal value of liq-
uidity, which, in turn, induces more conservative debt use in economic upturns. Pro-cyclical
equity issues critically depend on this cyclical variation of equity nancing costs as well;
equity issues tend to be counter-cyclical under constant external nancing conditions.
My quantitative analysis yields the following main results. First of all, equity issues are
pro-cyclical and concentrated for small, low prot, and large investment demand rms in
earlier stages of upturns. Lower capital accumulations during economic downturns leave a
number of small rms in earlier stage of economic upturns. Even with low current prots,
these small rms have large investment needs due to the decreasing returns to scale tech-
nology. To nance such endogenously large investment needs, small rms with low prots
rely heavily on equity issuance; both large debt servicing costs predicted by currently low
prots, and lower equity nancing costs in upturns encourage equity nancing at these ex-
ternal nancing margins. These business cyclical property and rm characteristics of equity
nancing are consistent with recent empirical ndings of Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) and
Frank and Goyal (2003).
Second, my model generates a positive correlation between payouts and equity issues,
and highlights the importance of stochastic equity nancing costs in driving this positive
correlation. Payouts move pro-cyclically and peak at later stages of economic expansions
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due to lower protability in economic contractions and large investment needs in earlier
stages of upturns. Counter-cyclical equity nancing costs drive pro-cyclical equity issuance,
resulting in a positive correlation with equity issues and payouts. Yet, constant external
nancing conditions lead to counter-cyclical equity issuance and consequently its negative
correlation with payout. This business cyclical property of payout and its positive correlation
with equity issuance are all consistent with Dittmar and Dittmar (2008).
Third, and unlike the standard trade-o¤ theory predictions, my model generates counter-
cyclical debt policies, and higher leverage ratios after debt issues and retirements during
economic downturns. A rm encounters external nancing margins frequently to fund operat-
ing needs for investment, even during economic downturns. Lower protability in downturns
raises the marginal value of liquidity, leading to active debt retirements and conservative
debt issues in upturns. Such low prots limit aggressive debt retirements in downturns as
well. These economic forces induce counter-cyclical debt policy, and, higher leverage ratios
after debt adjustments in downturns, even under constant external nancing conditions.
Counter-cyclical equity nancing costs strengthen the above counter-cyclical trends in debt
policy. My model ndings are consistent with the empirical work of Korajczyk and Levy
(2003) documenting counter-cyclicality in actual and target leverage ratios.
Fourth, my comparative static analysis points to pro-cyclical debt nancing policies for
nancially constrained rms. The ight-to-quality hypothesis predicts counter-cyclical debt
nancing costs for lower credit rating or more nancially constrained rms. My model di-
rectly shows that counter-cyclical variations in debt nancing costs drive pro-cyclical leverage
ratios and net debt issues. This nding is in line with the empirical works of Eri, Julio, Kim
and Weisbach (2011), and Korajczyk and Levy (2003); both studies document pro-cyclical
debt policies for nancially constrained rms.
Finally, my comparative static analysis also predicts pervasively conservative debt policies
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for the rms expecting nancial market shutdowns, a sharp protability drop, or a longer
stay in economic downturns. All of these factors form an expectation of large debt servicing
costs in economic downturns. Such large debt servicing costs endogenously limit debt issues
during economic upturns, leading to pervasively conservative debt policy across the whole
business cycle (Graham 2000). Furthermore, even a very highly protable rm in expansions
may maintain low leverage ratios due to a sharp drop of protability in economic downturns;
as such, a positive correlation between average prots and leverage ratios may no longer
hold. This latter nding also provides a new insight on the puzzling negative correlation
between protability and leverage ratios (Frank and Goyal 2008).
My analysis contributes to the literature in several ways. Most of all, I highlight invest-
ment dynamics as a key determinant in the cyclical variations of debt and equity issuance.
Lower protability in economic downturns does not necessarily imply lower leverage ratios
if operating needs for investment is considered. Low capital accumulations during economic
contractions endogenously create a number of small, low prots and large investment de-
mands rms in early stages of economic expansions, leading to active equity issuance. Next,
I emphasize how a large value of liquidity in economic downturns a¤ects corporate debt
policies in economic upturns. Large debt servicing costs in contractions encourage debt
retirements and discourage debt issues during expansions, which contributes to the counter-
cyclical debt policy and pervasively conservative use of debt. Finally, my model stresses the
signicance of stochastic external nancing conditions in a rms nancing policies. On the
one hand, counter-cyclical equity nancing costs are critical in pro-cyclical equity issuance
and its positive correlation with payout. On the other hand, counter-cyclical debt nancing
costs lead to pro-cyclical debt policies, widely observed in nancially constrained rms.
This joint consideration of investment dynamics, the marginal value of liquidity, and sto-
chastic equity nancing costs on the cyclicality of capital structure choice di¤ers markedly
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from prior literature in a number of aspects. Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) in-
vestigate how infrequent leverage adjustments and macroeconomic risk jointly a¤ect cyclical
variations of leverage ratios. Yet, they pay little attention to investment decisions and their
implications on the issuance of debt and equity. Bolton, Chen, andWang (2013), and Eistfeld
and Muir (2011) analyze how stochastic external nancing costs a¤ect internal and external
nancing policies but their models ignore the determinants of debt and equity nancing.
While my model emphasizes the implications of liquidity management on capital structure
dynamics, macroeconomic models such as Jermann and Quadrini (2011), Hennessy and Levy
(2007), and Covas and Den Haan (2011) stress contractual frictions between economic agents
to address cyclical changes in external nancing policies.
The next section introduces my model in detail. Section 3 studies the capital structure
dynamics in my baseline model. Section 4 conducts comparative static analysis to obtain
empirical predictions. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model
Macroeconomic shocks a¤ect a representative rms protability and external nancing costs.
A manager decides the rms investment and nancing policies for each period to maximize
the discounted value of future net dividends stream. Her choice set consists of liquidity
management, debt and equity nancing, real investment, and dividends payout decisions to
shareholders.
3.2.1 Macroeconomic States
A state variable, s ; represents the state of aggregate economy. There are two macroeconomic
states, economic expansion, s = h and economic contraction, s = l. The transition between
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expansion and contraction states follows a Markov process. The transition probability matrix
is denoted as : 0B@ phh phl
plh pll
1CA (3.1)
in which phh+phl and plh+pll are all equal to 1: phl points to the transition probability from
economic expansions to economic contractions and plh indicates the transition probability in
the other way around.
3.2.2 Prots and Investment
The rms prot function, (z; k; s); depends on capital stock, k, idiosyncratic protability
shock, z, xed operating cost, f; and macroeconomic states, s: I choose a standard functional
form for (z; k; s):
(z; k; s);= zszk   f (3.2)
where  captures the returns to scale of the prot function. zh is the realization of macroeco-
nomic protability shock in economic upturns and zl represents its counterpart in economic
downturns. The idiosyncractic protability shock, z; follows an AR(1) process in logs:
log z0 =  log z + " (3.3)
in which " has normal distribution with mean zero and variance 2. All primed variables
indicate next period ones.
Investment, I, is dened as the di¤erence between next period capital stock and current
capital stock after depreciation:
I = k0   (1  )k; (3.4)
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in which  is the depreciation rate of capital stock.
The installation and resale of capital stock incur organizational adjustment costs, Gk(k; I),
that are given by




where 1I 6=0 is an indicator function, the value of which is equal to one if investment is
nonzero, and zero otherwise. The capital adjustment cost is non-stochasitic because the
source of this cost is mainly an individual rms organizational capability. This functional
formulation includes both xed and convex capital adjustment costs, which is a standard one
in empirical literature. The xed cost is proportional to the level of current capital stock,
k and a large xed cost parameter k implies more lumpy investment. The convex cost is a
quadratic function of investment, I and a large convex cost parameter k indicates smoother
investment demands and high capital resale costs. See Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011, hereafter DDW) for more detailed discussion for
this formulation.
3.2.3 Liquidity and Debt
A state variable, c; represents the rms cash holding at the end of the previous period. Cash
stocks earn interests at the risk-free rate, r, and current liquidity holding is the sum of the
previous period cash holding and its interest earnings, c(1 + r). Carrying cash stock does
not involve any other explicit costs.
The manager issues a one period bond that pays interests at the same risk-free rate, r.
The current period principal payment is denoted as b. I introduce a collateral constraint to
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ensure the risk-free return to creditors:
b0(1 + r)  c0(1 + r) + (1  ) k0 + (zmin; k0; s = l)  Tax(zmin; k0; b0; c0; s = l); (3.6)
where zmin is the lower bound for the idiosyncratic protability shock. The next period debt
obligations must be smaller than the sum of liquidity holding, capital stock after depreciation,
and minimum after-tax prots in the next period. The minimum after tax prots are eval-
uated at the state of economic contraction that accompanies a lower aggregate protability
level, zl:
Debt issuance involves nancing cost that is modeled as a piecewise linear function:
Gb(b
0
; b; s) =  sb0 + s (b0   b) 1(b0 b)>0; (3.7)
in which 1(b0 b)>0 equals one if current period net debt issuance, b0   b, is positive, and
zero otherwise. The rst component is proportional to current period debt issuance, b0, and
 s ( h;  l) captures the magnitude of this baseline debt nancing cost, which potentially
varies with the macroeconomic state, s. The second term captures additional debt nancing
costs when a rm increases its net debt obligations (b0 > b), and s (h; l) represents
the increment of marginal debt nancing cost, which may depend on the state of business
cycle, s; as well. This cost function reects the convexity in debt nancing costs (Altinkihc
and Hansen 2000; Leary and Roberts 2005). See Gamba and Triantis (2008) for detailed
discussion about this functional formulation.
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3.2.4 Tax, Payout, and Valuation
The rms earnings before taxes (EBT), g; are equal to the sum of the rms operating prots
and interest earnings less depreciation and interest expenses:
g = (z; k; s)  k   r(b  c): (3.8)
The marginal tax rate depends on the sign of EBT. The tax rate for positive EBT, +c ,
exceeds the tax rate for negative EBT,  c : The positive tax rate for negative EBT is
considered as a rebate provided by the government. Accordingly, the rms tax bill is
Tax = +c g1g0    c g(1  1g0); (3.9)
where 1g0 is an indicator function that takes one if the rms EBT are positive, and zero
otherwise. This corporate taxation environment is identical to that of Hennessy and Whited
(2007).
The managers payout before equity nancing cost, e, is the sum of current prots and
net debt issuance less net debt payout, investment, tax bill, capital adjustment costs, and
debt nancing costs. Thus e can be summarized by the following equation:
e(z; k; b; c; s) = (z; k; s)+(b0 c0)  (b  c) (1+r) I Tax Gb(b0; b; s) Gk(k; I): (3.10)
External equity nancing, e < 0; incurs time-varying linear otation costs, Ge(e; s) :
Ge(e; s) = se1e<0; (3.11)
where 1e<0 is an indicator function that is equal to one if the rm issues equity, and zero
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otherwise. s (h; l) captures marginal equity nancing costs which rely on the realization
of macroeconomic states, s. Hennessy and Whited (2005) adopt the linear function for their
equity nancing costs.
The net payout to shareholders, d, is given by:
d(z; k; b; c; s) = (1 Ge(e; s)1e<0)e; (3.12)
in which 1e<0 is an indicator function that assumes the value one if the rm issues equity
and zero otherwise. The shareholders do not pay the tax on dividends income in accordance
with DDW.
The manager maximizes the discounted value of net payouts to shareholders. The dis-
count rate for the shareholders takes account of the interest income tax and I assume a at












The Bellman equation for the rms equity value is
V (z; k; b; c; s) = max
k0;b0;c0
d(z; k; b; c; k0; b0; c0; s) +
1
1 + r(1   i)
EV (z; k0; b0; c0; s0); (3.14)
where the rms optimal policy is subjected to the collateral constraint (3.6). See Hennessy
and Whited (2005) for the contraction mapping property of this Bellman equation.
The model includes the following key elements: interest tax shields, liquidity manage-
ment, endogenous investment, persistent macroeconomic and indiosyncratic protability
shocks, and capital adjustment costs. Macroeconomic states also a¤ect the supply of credit,
which potentially induces stochastic variations in equity and debt nancing costs. Contrary
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to prior models, my model comprehensively incorporates the real and nancing side implica-
tions of macroeconomic shocks - investment, protability and external nancing costs. For
instance, Bharma et al. (2010) ignore the implications on investment dynamics on nancing
policies. Jermann and Quadrini (2011) pay little attention to the role of stochastic external
nancing costs. Furthermore, a managers liquidity management is a key corporate policy
in my model, which di¤ers markedly from prior models.
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
3.3.1 Calibration
To precisely investigate quantitative implications of the model, I choose the baseline para-
meters via the simulated method of moments (SMM) by following DDW and Lee (2013).
The SMM estimation nds a set of structural parameters driving the moments of articially
simulated data from the model as close as possible to the corresponding empirical moments.
This estimation procedure helps ensure tight connections between the models quantitative
predictions and a rms nancing and investment policy in the real world.
To gain e¢ ciency in the structural estimation procedure, I rst parameterize the xed
operating cost as follows:
f = kss;
where kss indicates the steady state level of capital stock. The parameter  governs the size
of the xed operating costs.
In my baseline model, I set the debt nancing cost parameters as time invariant ones,
 h =  l =  and h = l = . As the ight to quality hypothesis predicts, an individual
rms debt nancing cost variations depend on its characteristics such as credit ratings or
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Table 3.1: Moments Selection: Acutal and Simulated Values
Variables Actual Moments Simulated Moments
Avg. Investment(I=k) 0.1341 0.1324
Avg. Leverage: Contraction (b=k; s = l) 0.2321 0.2331
Avg. Leverage: Expansion (b=k; s = h) 0.2213 0.2234
Avg. Tobins q(V + b  c)=k) 1.7013 1.715
Avg. Prot (=k) 0.1731 0.1748
Equity Fin. Freq: Contraction (d < 0; s = l) 0.0750 0.0752
Equity Fin. Freq: Expansion (d < 0; s = h) 0.1204 0.1244
Avg. Dividends (d=k; d > 0) 0.0374 0.0358
Var. Investment(I=k) 0.0225 0.0242
Var. Prot (=k) 0.0045 0.0036
SerialCor. Prot (=k) 0.6315 0.6296
Avg. Cash: Contraction (c=k) 0.1247 0.1267
Avg. Cash: Expansion (c=k) 0.1136 0.1152
The actual moments calculations are based on a sample of non nancial, unregulated rms
from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database. The sample period is 19882010. The sim-
ulated moments are from the baseline model simulation evaluated at the SMM estimates.
All moment variables are self-explanatory and the construction of empirical moments is
described in Appendix A.
prot volatilities. For example, high credit rating rms may have lower debt nancing costs
during economic downturns due to the credit suppliers preference on safer assets. Dittmar
and Dittmar (2008) also document relatively smaller cyclical variations in debt nancing
costs than equity nancing costs. Thus, it is quite reasonable to set the representative
rms debt nancing cost parameters as time invariant ones. I quantitatively analyze the
implications of time varying debt nancing costs in later sections.
I also x a group of structural parameters at economically reasonable levels to improve the
e¢ ciency of the estimation procedure. The tax rate for positive taxable corporate income,
+c ; is set to 0.35, which is the maximum of corporate tax rate during the sample period. The
tax rate for negative taxable income,  c ; is xed at 0.09 reecting the e¤ective tax rate on
negative EBT from the taxation function of Hennessy and Whited (2005). The depreciation
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rate,  is 0.12 similar to Hennessy and Whited (2005) and DDW. The risk free interest rate,
r; is 0.025 and the interest income tax,  i, is 0.25, consistent with Hennessy and Whited
(2005). The macroeconomic protability in economic upturns, zh; and economic downturns,
zl are xed at 1.09 and 0.91 respectively, to reect 18% protability di¤erence in public rms
between two macroeconomic states. The transition probability from economic upturns to
downturn, phl, is 0.2 to take account of the average duration of economic boom, 5 years.
The transition probability from economic downturn to upturn is 0.5 similar to Bolton, Chen,
and Wang (2013).
The following parameters are estimated via the SMM procedure: the uncertainty ; and
serial correlation ; of the protability shock; the prot function curvature ; the xed capital
adjustment cost k and convex capital adjustment cost k; the linear equity nancing cost in
economic expansions h; and economic contractions l; the constant baseline debt nancing
cost  and the additional debt nancing cost ; and the xed operating cost parameter :
Table 3.1 reports the selected moments variables for the identication of the model. The
table also documents the empirical moments based on CRSP/Compustat merged database
from 1988 to 2010 and the simulated moments from the model at the baseline SMM estimates.
These moments consist of the rst and second moments of investment and operating prots.
The autocorrelation of operating prots, and the average dividends, and Tobins q values
are also included. The average of equity nancing frequency, cash and leverage ratios are
reported according to the business cyclical variations. This moment selection is closely
related to the identication strategy of DDW and Lee (2013). Appendix contains detailed
information about the models identication, numerical solution, and SMM procedure.
Table 3.2 reports the baseline economic parameters estimated via the SMM procedure.
The estimation results are consistent with the prior estimates. The persistency parameter
 is 0.6891, the uncertainty parameter  is 0.1763, and the returns to scale parameter  is
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Table 3.2: Structural Parameter Estimation Results
   k k l h    J-test (p-value)
0.6891 0.1763 0.7411 0.0088 0.1091 0.0365 0.0461 0.0012 0.0068 0.0273 0.1532
This table reports the estimated structural parameters and the result of over-identication test. The value
 and  are the persistency and uncertainty of the protability shock process (log z).  is the curvature of
prot function. k and k are the xed and convex capital adjustment costs. l and h are linear equity
nancing costs for economic downturns and upturns, respectively.  is the baseline debt nancing cost and 
captures the increase in marginal debt nancing cost when the rms net debt issuance is positive.  is the
xed operating cost parameter proportional to the steady state state capital stock kss. The J-test is the 2
test for the over-identifying restrictions of the model. Its p-value is reported.
0.7411, all of which are in line with DDW and Lee (2013). The xed capital adjustment
cost parameter k is 0.0088 and the convex capital adjustment cost k is 0.1091. Both
parameters estimates are within economically reasonable ranges, as in DDW, Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006), and Whited (1992). The linear equity nancing cost parameter of
economic downturn, l is 0.0316 and that of economic upturns, h is 0.0465, both of which
are smaller than the estimate of Hennessy and Whited (2005). The baseline debt issuance
cost  b is 0.12% for all proceeds. The maximum debt nancing cost
 
 b + b

is 0.80% of
debt proceeds, lower than the average debt issuance cost estimate in Altinkihc and Hansen
(2000).
3.3.2 Equity Issues and Payouts
This section studies the cyclical variations of equity nancing and payout policies in the
baseline economy.
Table 3.3 provides a representative example of equity issuance and payout dynamics by
examining a times series evolution of 3,000 rms. The economy starts from an economic
contraction period (t =  1) and maintains economic expansions afterwards ( t = 0; 1; 2; 3).
The table reports aggregate dividends (payouts), equity proceeds, investments and prots for
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Table 3.3: Equity Issue and Payout: An Example
Time Period -1 0 1 2 3
Econ. State Contraction Expansion Expansion Expansion Expansion










0.565 1.000 0.994 1.013 1.060
Investment (
P
i Ii) 0.806 1.000 0.915 0.913 0.873
Prots (
P
i i) 0.809 1.000 1.025 1.028 1.033
This table reports aggregate equity issues, payout, investments, and prots for 2005 years simu-
lations of 3000 rms. Initial 2000 years simulations are dropped for stationarity. All of the four
variables are normalized by their values at time 0. The table also includes equity nancing fre-
quency for each time period. Macroeconomic state is initially contraction at time -1 but remains
expansion afterwards.
each time period. All variables are standardized by their values at the beginning of economic
expansion (t = 0). For instance, the equity issues at period 1 is 93.6% of equity issues at
period 0. The table also includes the equity nancing frequency for the cross-section of 3,000
rms.
Table 3.3 shows that equity nancing activities are concentrated in early stages of eco-
nomic upturns and that payouts expand over economic upturns. Both equity nancing
frequency and equity proceeds are quite low at the economic contraction, t =  1. (row 1
and 2) These two measures surge at the initial period of the economic upturn (t = 0) but
decrease monotonically over the economic expansion periods (t = 1; 2; 3). For instance, the
equity nancing frequency of the period 3 drops by more than 25% compared to that of the
period 0. The payout stays low at the economic downturn (t =  1, row 3). Yet, the payout
signicantly grows at the beginning of economic expansion (t = 0) and gradually increases
afterwards (t = 1; 2; 3). For example, the payout of the period 3 is 6% larger than that of
the period 0.
The patterns of equity issues and payout are closely associated with the joint dynamics
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Table 3.4: Equity Financing Firm Characteristics: An
Example
Time Period 0 1 2
Econ. State Expansion Expansion Expansion
Rel. Investment (I=k) 1.265 1.446 1.128
Rel. Prots (=k) 0.884 0.881 0.805
Rel. Cash (c=k) 0.974 1.242 1.668
Rel. Leverage (b=k) 0.622 0.540 0.669
Rel. Size (k) 0.820 0.795 0.746
This table reports the relative size of investments, prots, cash,
leverage, and size of equity issuing rms compared to an aver-
age rm of each time period. All samples are selected from the
simulation of Table 3.3
of investment demands and prots. While aggregate investment decreases over the economic
expansion, total prots generally grow over the expansion periods (t = 0; 1; 2; 3). With large
investment needs and low prots, these rms appear to issue equity frequently in earlier
stages of economic expansions. Yet, such large capital accumulations diminish investment
needs and realize ample operating prots in later stages of economic upturns. These rms
try to payout a signicant amount of money as dividends in later stages of upturns.
Table 3.4 documents the characteristics of equity nancing rms for the time period
of 0, 1, and 2. The table reports the investment, leverage, prots, liquidity, and size of
equity nancing rms for each time period, from the simulation of Table 3.3. Each rm
characteristic is normalized by the cross-sectional average value of all 3,000 rms for each
time period. For instance, the relative investment of equity nancing rms at period 0 is 1.26,
which indicates their investment demands are 26% larger than an average rms investment
at period 0.
Table 3.4 reveals the characteristics of equity issuance rms. The table shows that small,
low protable rms with large investment issue equity frequently. For instance, the invest-
ment demands of equity nancing rms at period 0 are more than 20% larger than that of the
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average rm. Yet, their protability is 12% smaller and their size is 20% smaller than those
of the average rm. Even with a relatively low current protability realization, a small size
rm possibly has large investment demands due to the DRS prot technology. Such large
investment needs and low prots drive the rm toward external nancing margins. Due
to the large debt servicing costs and low tax benets predicted by currently low operating
prots, the rm tends to rely substantially on equity issuance.
Lower capital accumulations during economic downturns and counter-cyclical external
equity nancing costs lead to such concentrations of equity issuance in early stages of upturns.
As indicated in Table 3.4, economic downturns involve low capital accumulations, which
leaves a number of small rms in early stages of expansions. With lower equity nancing costs
in upturns, these small rms with low prots tend to use equity nancing quite frequently
for their investment.
This nding highlights the importance of investment dynamics on equity issuance deci-
sions. To fund large investments with low prots, small rms tend to rely heavily on equity
issuance. Relatively low capital accumulations in downturns endogenously create such ex-
ternal nancing margins intensively in early stages of economic upturns. This nding is
contradictory to the standard trade-o¤ theory predictions, which emphasize lower protabil-
ity and large debt obligations as main economic forces behind equity nancing.
Table 3.5 compares the cyclicality of equity issues and payouts between the baseline
economy and an economy with constant external nancing conditions. The table reports
equity proceeds, payouts and the frequency of equity nancing for economic contractions,
economic expansions, and the start and the end of economic expansions. Payouts and equity
proceeds are standardized by the average values at the start of economic upturns, as in Table
3.3. This table also documents the correlation between payout and equity issue series.
The baseline model of Table 3.5 yields very similar cyclical variations in equity issuance
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Table 3.5: Equity Issue and Payout Dynamics
Panel A. Baseline
Econ State Contraction Expansion Start-Expan. End-Expan.










0.630 1.009 1.000 1.012
Corr(Payout, Equity) 0.426
Panel B. Constant External Financing










0.575 1.031 1.000 1.041
Corr(Payout, Equity) -0.555
This table documents aggregate equity issues, aggregate payout, and equity nanc-
ing frequency from 5,000 years simulations of 3000 rms. Initial 2000 years simula-
tions are dropped for stationarity These variables are documented according to four
phases of business cycle- contraction, expansion, the start of expansion and the end
of expansion. Aggregate equity and payout are normalized by those values at the
start of expansion. Panel A summarizes the baseline model simulation results and
Panel B.
and payout polices as a representative simulation of Table 3.4 does. All of equity nancing
frequency, equity proceeds and payouts move pro-cyclically. Firms use equity nancing most
frequently and collect the largest sum of equity proceeds in the earliest stage of economic
upturns (row 1, 2). At the end of economic upturns, rms pay out the largest amount
of money to shareholders. They also issue less equity than they did in earlier stages of
economic upturns. The table points out a positive correlation between payout and equity
issuance (0.5455) as well.
Yet, the model with time invariant external nancing conditions generate contradicting
results. Both of equity nancing frequency and equity proceeds move counter-cyclically in
contrast to the benchmark economy. The frequency of equity nancing in economic down-
turns is slightly greater and the amount of equity proceeds is 35% greater than their coun-
terparts in economic upturns (row 1, 2). This countercyclical variation in equity proceeds
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drives a negative correlation between equity issuance and payout under the economy with
constant external nancing conditions.
This result highlights the importance of counter-cyclical equity nancing costs in payout
and equity issue dynamics. The counter-cyclical variation drives pro-cyclical equity issues,
which leads to a positive correlation between equity issuance and payout. Table 3.5 clearly
indicates that equity issues tend to move counter-cyclically under constant external nancing
conditions, consistent with the standard trade-o¤ theory predictions. Due to large debt
servicing costs and lower tax benets, a rm generally has stronger equity nancing incentives
in economic downturns, under time invariant external nancing conditions.
These ndings are all in line with recent empirical ndings. Ditmmar and Ditmmar
(2008) document that public rms tend to issue equity in early stages of economic boom and
increase payouts (share repurchase) in later stages, observations which are exactly consistent
with the ndings in Table 3.3 and 3.5. They also show that the correlation between aggregate
equity issuance and share repurchase is positive, which is also in line with the correlation
result of my baseline model. Equity nancing is more likely to occur in small growth rms
that generate lower operating prots (Frank and Goyal 2003). These rm characteristics are
well matched with the ndings in Table 3.4.
To sum up, this section presents two interesting ndings. First, endogenous investment
needs drive active equity issues for small, low protable, and large investment needs rms
in earlier stages of economic upturns. This nding is contradictory to the standard trade-o¤
theory predictions primarily focusing on a rms protability. Second, counter-cyclical equity
nancing costs drive pro-cyclical equity issues, leading to a positive correlation between
payout and equity issuance.
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Table 3.6: Firm Characteristics: Deb Issuance and Retirement
Debt Issuance (b0 > b) Debt Retirement (b0 < b)
Econ State Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion
Rel. Investment (I=k) 2.872 2.275 0.000 0.007
Rel. Prots (=k) 1.465 1.386 0.810 0.779
Rel. Cash (c=k) 0.324 0.225 0.836 1.066
Rel. Leverage (b=k) 0.992 0.965 1.390 1.373
Investment (I=k) 0.324 0.314 0.000 0.001
Prots (=k) 0.218 0.259 0.121 0.145
Cash (c=k) 0.041 0.027 0.102 0.126
Leverage (b=k) 0.228 0.219 0.319 0.312
Next Period Lev. (b0=k0) 0.311 0.271 0.258 0.226
This table reports investments, prots, cash and leverage from 3,000 years simula-
tions of 3000 rms. All values are reported for debt issuance and debt retirements
rms according to macroeconomic states. The rst four rows document relative
ratio between these variables and their counterparts in an average rm. The next
four rows summarize the absolute value of each variable. The last row reports next
period leverage ratios.
3.3.3 Debt Dynamics
This section analyzes the cyclical variations of debt nancing policies in my baseline model.
Before entering the analysis of debt dynamics, Table 3.6 summarizes the characteristics of
debt issuance and debt retirement rms in my baseline model simulation of 3,000 rms. The
table reports investment, prot, cash and leverage ratios according to the macroeconomic
states. The rst four rows compare these rm characteristics with their counterparts in an
average rm for each cross-section. For instance, debt issuance rmscash-asset ratio (row
3) is 32.4% of an average rms cash-asset ratio. The next four rows document absolute
values of investment, prot, cash, and leverage ratios for debt issuance and retirement rms.
The last row reports next period leverage ratios as well.
Table 3.6 clearly points to the importance of investment dynamics in debt issuance de-
cisions. While the protability of debt issuance rms is around 40% greater than that of an
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average rm, their investment demand is 2.5 times of an average rms investment needs (row
1, 2). Such large investment needs over operating prots endogenously create substantial
external nancing demands, especially for low cash holding rms (row 3). These rms tend
to rely heavily on debt issuance because currently high protability predicts large future
prot generations that accompany large tax benets, and low liquidity costs of debt, i.e.
debt servicing costs.
Table 3.6 also indicates the signicant role of investment demands on debt retirement
policies. The debt obligations of debt retirement rms are almost 40% larger than that of
an average rm (row 4). Yet, they have almost zero investments, which allow an easier use
of operating prots and internal funds for retiring debt obligations.
It is also noticeable that the leverage ratios after debt issuance or retirement are higher
during economic downturns even with pro-cyclical macroeconomic protability variations
(row 9). For instance, leverage ratio after debt issuance is 0.31 during economic downturn
but is 0.27 during economic upturns. To fund quite large operating needs for investment, a
rm considerably relies on debt nancing even during economic downturns. Relatively low
operating prots (row 6) deter aggressive use of internal funds for debt retirements, leading
to higher leverage ratios after debt retirement in economic downturns. Counter-cyclical
equity nancing costs, of course, contribute to more aggressive debt issues during economic
downturns. Yet, these aggressive debt policies in downturn still hold for constant external
nancing condition economy, even though the detailed results are not reported here.
These rm characteristics highlight the importance of investment dynamics on debt is-
suance and retirement decisions, in contrast to the standard trade-o¤ theory predictions.
The standard trade-o¤ theory almost entirely relies on a rms protability in the determi-
nation of leverage dynamics. Yet, a rm critically relies on debt issuance to fund operating
needs for large investment, particularly with low levels of cash. Lower investment demands
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Table 3.7: Debt Dynamics
Equity Cost: Contraction Baseline l= h





i ki) 0.230 0.227 0.229 0.227














0 < b 0.224 0.184 0.231 0.179





i I) 0.025 -0.008 0.008 -0.002
This table reports aggregate leverage, debt issues, debt retirement, and net debt issues for the baseline
and a constant external nancing cost economy (l= h) from 3,000 years simulations of 3000 rms.
It also includes the frequency of equity nancing. All values are documented according to the business
cyclical states.
also allow exible use of internal funds to retire debt obligations given the same protability.
Table 3.7 investigates debt and equity policies across the business cycle for the baseline
economy and an economy with constant external nancing conditions (l = h). The table
reports aggregate leverage ratio, debt issues, debt retirements and net debt issues. It also
documents the frequency of equity nancing. All values are evaluated in accordance with the
macroeconomic states. The debt issues, retirements, and net debt issues are standardized
by the sum of investment for each time period. This standardization reects the importance
of investment dynamics on debt issuance as analyzed in Table 3.6.
Table 3.7 clearly indicates counter-cyclical variations in debt policies. Both leverage ratio
and net debt issuance (row 1, 5) show weakly counter-cyclical movements, contradictory to
the standard trade-o¤ theory predictions. For example, the aggregate leverage ratio is 0.23 in
economic downturns but slightly goes down to 0.227 in economic upturns. The same pattern
holds for aggregate net debt issues. Furthermore, the aggregate debt issuance-investment
ratio is even larger during economic downturns (row 3), which points to a signicant role of
debt issuance for funding investments.
This counter-cyclical debt policy is not a mere result of counter-cyclical equity nancing
costs. The constant external nancing cost economy in Table 3.7 still shows weakly counter-
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Table 3.8: Debt Dynamics: Low Debt Financing Costs
Equity Cost: Contraction Baseline l= 0:3





i ki) 0.871 0.864 0.788 0.764














0 < b 0.672 0.440 0.477 0.547





i I) -0.139 0.032 0.199 -0.080
This table reports aggregate leverage, debt issues, debt retirement, and net debt issues for the baseline
and higher equity nancing cost model (l= 0:3) from 3,000 years simulations of 3000 rms. Debt
nancing costs ( ; ) are set to (0:0005; 0:0005). It also includes the frequency of equity nancing. All
values are documented according to the business cyclical states.
cyclical leverage ratios and net debt issuance patterns (row 1, 5). The leverage ratio is slightly
higher and the amount of net debt issues is also slightly larger in economic downturns.
Lower protability and consequently a higher value of liquidity play central roles in
this counter-cyclical debt policy. As indicated in Table 3.6, lower protability in economic
downturns limits aggressive debt retirements during economic downturns. Furthermore, a
higher value of liquidity or large debt servicing costs in economic downturns induce active
debt retirements and conservative debt issues in economic upturns. A manager has strong
incentives to retire debt obligations by using ample operating prots in economic upturns,
with the expectation of a highly valuable liquidity in downturns. She also limits the issuance
debt in anticipation of large debt servicing costs during economic downturns. All of these
factors contribute the counter-cyclical movements in debt policies.1
Table 3.8 simulates models under an economic environment with low debt nancing
costs. The marginal equity nancing cost in economic downturns is identical to the baseline
model in the rst scenario, and quite higher in the second scenario. The table documents
aggregate leverage ratio, debt issues, debt retirements and net debt issues according to the
1I will mainly investigate how debt servicing costs in downturns a¤ect a rms capital structure dynamics
in my comparative static analysis.
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macroeconomic states. It also documents the frequency of equity nancing. Debt issues,
retirements, and net debt issues are standardized by total investments for each time period
as in Table 3.7.
Table 3.8 emphasizes the "timing" aspect of debt retirement policies. Debt retirements
in economic upturn arise sharply from 0.44 to 0.54 with a substantial increase of equity
nancing costs in economic downturns. Debt retirements in downturns rather decrease sub-
stantially from 0.67 to 0.47, given the same external equity nancing cost changes. Low
debt nancing costs imply relatively lower costs of maintaining debt obligations. A manager
could easily timedebt retirements with such low debt nancing costs. A higher external
equity nancing cost raises the marginal value of liquidity in downturns and accordingly the
manager tries to retire debt obligations with ample operating prots in economic upturns.
It is also remarkable that the leverage ratios drop substantially in the higher equity
nancing cost case. For instance, the leverage ratio of economic downturn in the rst sce-
nario is 0.86 but decrease to 0.76 in the second simulation. A higher equity nancing cost
implies a large marginal value of liquidity and consequently large debt servicing costs in
economic downturns. To avoid such large debt servicing costs, a rm optimally maintains
lower leverage ratios, as in Lee (2013).
The joint considerations of investment dynamics, pro-cyclical protability, and stochastic
equity nancing costs are pivotal in the counter-cyclical debt policies. A rm may have
to use external debt issuance frequently to fund its operating needs for investments, even
during economic downturns. Lower protability raises the marginal value of liquidity during
economic downturns, which encourages active debt retirements and discourages debt issues
during economic upturns. This lower protability also limits the use of internal funds for
retiring debt obligations during economic downturns. Higher equity nancing costs induce
additional debt issues at such external nancing margins, and increase the marginal value
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of liquidity more signicantly in economic downturns.
To summarize, my model highlights investment demand as a main economic force behind
debt issuance. It also generates counter-cyclical debt policies, and higher leverage ratios
after debt issuance and retirement during economic downturns, contradictory to the standard
trade-o¤ theory predictions. Operating needs for investment, pro-cyclical protability, and
counter-cyclical equity nancing costs all contribute to these cyclical properties of debt
nancing policies.
3.4 Quantitative Analysis: Comparative Statics
3.4.1 Counter-cyclical Debt Financing Costs
This section analyzes how counter-cyclical variations of external debt nancing costs a¤ect
capital structure dynamics.
The ight to quality hypothesis predicts that an individual rms credit quality is an
important determinant in its debt nancing cost variation. For instance, Caballelo and
Krishmamurthy (2008) argue that investors become more risk averse in poor macroeconomic
conditions, which shifts their preference toward safer assets. Hence, the hypothesis predicts
that a lower credit rating rm may access the debt nancing market very limitedly during
economic downturns. Recent survey works of Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2011) indeed
document higher external nancing costs for nancially constrained rms in the nancial
crisis of 2008.
To examine the implications of limited access to the debt nancing market during eco-
nomic downturns, Table 3.9 simulates an individual rm at three di¤erent levels of debt
nancing costs in economic downturns. The rst scenario deals with an economy with pro-
cyclical debt nancing costs. Debt nancing cost parameters change to moderately counter-
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Table 3.9: Counter-cyclical Debt Financing Costs
( 
l
; l) 0:75 ( h; h) 1:5 ( h; h) 2 ( h; h)
Econ State Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion
Leverage (b=k) 0.301 0.278 0.126 0.145 0.076 0.107
Equity Freq (d < 0) 0.061 0.132 0.153 0.136 0.163 0.134
Net Debt Issue ((b0   b)=k) 0.011 -0.003 -0.009 0.005 -0.015 0.008
This table reports leverage ratio, equity nancing frequency and net debt issues from 52000 years simulations of
a rm, according to macroeconomic states. Initial 2000 years of simulations are dropped for stationarity. The
results are evaluated at three di¤erent levels of debt nancing costs in economic downturns.
cyclical in the second case and become strongly counter-cyclical in the last scenario. An
individual rms leverage ratios, net debt issues, and equity nancing frequency are reported
according to the macroeconomic states.
Table 3.9 clearly points out that a counter-cyclical debt nancing cost leads to more
pro-cyclical debt nancing policies. As counter-cyclicality of debt nancing costs increases,
both leverage ratios and net debt issue become more pro-cyclical (row 1, 3). For instance,
the leverage ratio is higher in economic downturns for the rst scenario. Yet, the other two
cases show pro-cyclical leverage ratio variations (row 1).
This pro-cyclical debt policy is consistent with recent empirical ndings. Korajyak and
Levy (2003) document pro-cyclical target leverage ratios for nancially constrained rms.
My model successfully shows that counter-cyclical debt nancing costs could drive such pro-
cyclical leverage ratios. Moreover, Covas and Den Haan (2011) report more pro-cyclical debt
issues in smaller size rms. Reecting the fact that the size of rm is a widely used proxy
for nancial constraint, my simulation results are well aligned with Covas and Den Haan
(2011). Eli, Julio, Kim and Weisbach (2011) also documents counter-cyclical debt issues for
nancially constrained rms.
This section suggests counter-cyclical debt nancing cost variations as a potentialreason
behind pro-cyclical debt policies for nancially constrained rms. The ight to the qual-
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Table 3.10: Financial Market Shutdowns
( 
l
; l) at l= 0:3 0:75 ( h; h) 1:5 ( h; h) 2 ( h; h)
Econ State Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion
Leverage (b=k) 0.311 0.266 0.140 0.140 0.081 0.099
Equity Freq (d < 0) 0.000 0.145 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.156
Net Debt Issue ((b0   b)=k) 0.017 -0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.008 0.006
This table reports leverage ratio, equity nancing frequency and net debt issues from 52000 years simulations of
a rm, according to macroeconomic states. Initial 2000 years of simulations are dropped for stationarity. The
results are evaluated at three di¤erent levels of debt nancing costs in economic downturns at l = 0:3.
ity hypothesis predicts more counter-cyclical debt nancing cost variations for nancially
constrained rms due to the shift of credit supply toward safer assets. My model directly
generates pro-cyclical debt policies under counter-cyclical variations in debt nancing costs.
3.4.2 Financial Market Shutdowns
This section investigates the potential implications of nancial market shutdowns in economic
downturns on a rms capital structure choices.
Table 3.10 summarizes the potential e¤ects of nancial market shutdowns. While the
debt nancing costs in each scenario is identical to their counterparts in Table 3.9, I set
equity nancing costs in downturns as 30% of equity proceeds to induce quite strong counter-
cyclicality for equity nancing costs. As in Table 3.9, an individual rms leverage ratios,
net debt issues, and equity nancing frequency are reported according to the macroeconomic
states.
Table 3.10 indicates that the expectation of nancial market shutdowns potentially drive
a conservative debt policy during economic upturns. As external nancing conditions become
more deteriorated in economic downturns, leverage ratios decrease substantially (row 1) and
equity nancing frequency increases slightly during economic upturns (row 2). For instance,
the leverage ratio of economic upturns is initially 0.266 but drops signicantly to 0.099 in the
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third case (row 1). Furthermore, all of the leverage ratios during economic upturns slightly
lower than their counterparts in Table 3.9. Financial market shutdowns imply large debt
servicing costs in economic downturns, leading to more conservative debt issues in economic
upturns.
This nding is closely associated with the debt conservatism puzzle (Graham 2000). The
considerations of nancial market shutdowns during economic downturns limit the use of
debt nancing in economic upturns. Therefore, a rm may appear to use debt conservatively
across the whole period of business cycle.
To sum up, the expectation of nancial market shutdowns in economic downturns leads
to conservative debt policy during economic upturns, which potentially drives a pervasively
conservative debt policy. The expectation of large debt servicing costs plays the central role
here.
3.4.3 Deeper Economic Downturns
This section studies the role of deeper economic downturns on capital structure dynamics.
For this purpose, I conduct two comparative static analyses. First, I increase the macroeco-
nomic protability di¤erence between economic expansion and contraction states. Second, I
extend the duration of economic downturns.
Table 3.11 summarizes the nancing and investment policies for two di¤erent scales of
macroeconomic protability shock variations. The macroeconomic protability of economic
upturns, zh, is 1.05 and that of downturns, zl, is 0.95 in the rst economy. These values are
1.2 and 0.8 respectively in the second scenario. Table 3.11 reports the average leverage ratio
and protability over the whole business cycle. It also documents investment, operating
prots, cash, leverage and equity nancing frequency in accordance with the macroeconomic
states.
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Table 3.11: A Sharper Di¤erence in Aggregate Protability
(zl; zh) Small: (0.95,1.05) Large: (0.8,1.2)
Prots (=k) 0.173 0.188
Leverage (b=k) 0.278 0.142
Econ State Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion
Investment (I=k) 0.120 0.136 0.071 0.156
Prots (=k) 0.158 0.179 0.107 0.220
Cash (c=k) 0.114 0.111 0.119 0.104
Leverage (b=k) 0.280 0.278 0.142 0.142
Equity Freq (d < 0) 0.076 0.188 0.107 0.077
This table reports nancing and investment variables from 52000 years simula-
tions of a rm, for two di¤erent magnitude of aggregate protability di¤erences.
Initial 2000 years of simulations are dropped for stationarity. First two rows
report operating prots and leverage ratio over the whole business cycle. In-
vestments, operating prots, cash, leverage and equity nancing frequency are
separately documented for economic contraction and expansion periods.
Table 3.11 points out that a sharp drop in protability during economic downturn could
drive a conservative debt policy over the whole business cycle. Even though the average
protability increases by 10% (0:173! 0:188), the average leverage ratio decreases sharply
(0:278 ! 0:142). It is also remarkable that rms expecting a sharp drop in protability
maintain lower leverage ratios (0:278 ! 0:142) during economic upturns even with a sub-
stantial increase in their average protability (0:179! 0:220). Lower protability generates
large debt servicing costs in economic contractions, which restrains debt issuance during
economic upturns as well as downturns.
Table 3.12 documents the nancing and investment policies for two di¤erent durations of
economic downturns. The transition probability from downturns to upturns, plh, is 0.4 and
the duration of economic downturn is 1.67 years (1=0:6) in the rst scenario. The probability
and duration become 0.2 and 5 years (1=0:2) respectively in the second model simulation.
Table 3.12 reports the average leverage ratio and protability over the whole business. It
also documents investment, operating prots, cash, leverage and equity nancing frequency
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Table 3.12: A Longer Duration of Economic Contraction
Transition Probability plh= 0:4 plh= 0:8
Prots (=k) 0.177 0.169
Leverage (b=k) 0.260 0.151
Econ State Contraction Expansion Contraction Expansion
Investment (I=k) 0.121 0.135 0.105 0.159
Prots (=k) 0.149 0.186 0.150 0.188
Cash (c=k) 0.123 0.121 0.147 0.107
Leverage (b=k) 0.262 0.259 0.145 0.156
Equity Freq (d < 0) 0.065 0.113 0.172 0.183
This table reports nancing and investment variables from 52000 years simula-
tions of a rm, for two di¤erent durations of economic downturns. Initial 2000
years of simulations are dropped for stationarity. First two rows report operating
prots and leverage ratio over the whole business cycle. Investments, operating
prots, cash, leverage and equity nancing frequency are separately documented
for economic contraction and expansion periods.
according to the macroeconomic states.
Table 3.12 also suggests that the expectation of deeper economic downturns limits the
use of debt over the whole business cycle. The average leverage ratio drops substantially
(0:260! 0:151) in spite of a moderate drop in average protability between two simulations
(0:177! 0:169). Similar to the results of Table 3.8, a rm with a longer duration of economic
downturns maintains lower leverage ratios even during economic upturns (0:259 ! 0:156).
These rms rather rely more heavily on equity issuance even during economic upturns,
compared to their counterparts in the rst scenario (0:113! 0:183).
These ndings provide new insights on the debt conservatism (Graham 2000) and the
puzzling negative correlation between protability and leverage ratios (Frank and Goyal
2008). A manager may exercise pervasively conservative debt policy across the business
cycle due to large debt servicing costs from a sharp prot drop or a longer stay in economic
downturns. Moreover, even a very highly protable rm in economic expansions possibly
maintains lower leverages because of a sharp protability drop and large debt servicing costs
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in economic contraction. Therefore, a rms protability does not necessarily move positively
with leverage ratios, unlike the standard trade-o¤ theory predictions. With the expectation
of large debt servicing costs, a manager also relies more substantially on equity nancing as
expected in Lee (2013).
To sum up, my model shows the expectation of deeper economic downturns leads to more
conservative debt policy over the whole business cycle. Lower protability in economic down-
turns predicts more conservative debt policy during economic upturns, even with a higher
average protability. A longer duration of economic downturn also drives more conservative
debt policy and frequent equity nancing activities during economic upturns. These macro-
economic considerations possibly lead to pervasively conservative debt policy (Graham 2000)
and a negative correlation between protability and leverage ratios (Frank and Goyal 2008).
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Macroeconomic conditions a¤ect a rms investment demands, protability, and external
nancing conditions altogether. I studied how these simultaneous changes impact cyclical
variations in capital structure policies. Lower protability in downturns, investment dynam-
ics, counter-cyclical equity nancing costs are all pivotal in the capital structure dynamics.
Lower protability increases the marginal value of liquidity in downturns leading to active
debt retirements and limited debt issues in upturns. Investment demands drive active debt
issues even during economic downturns. Counter-cyclical equity nancing costs induce pro-
cyclical equity issues and intensify counter-cyclical movements in debt policies.
In line with recent empirical ndings, my baseline model generates counter-cyclical debt
policy and pro-cyclical patterns of equity issues and payout. In particular, equity issues
are concentrated for small, low protable, large investment demand rm in early stages of
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upturns. Low capital accumulations in downturns lead to this business cyclical property.
Payouts peak in later stages of economic upturns due to the lower protability in downturn
and large investment demands in early stages of upturns. Leverage ratios after debt issues
and retirements are even higher in economic downturns, unlike the standard trade-o¤ theory
predictions. These business cycle properties in debt, equity and payout policies are all
consistent with empirical works of Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) and Korajczyk and Levy
(2003).
My comparative static analysis also predicts pro-cyclical debt policies for nancially
constrained rms and pervasively conservative debt policies for rms expecting nancial
market shutdowns, a sharp protability drop and a longer stay in economic downturns. The
ight to quality hypothesis expects more counter-cyclical debt nancing cost variations for
nancially constrained rms, which leads to pro-cyclical debt policies in my model. Financial
market shutdowns, a sharp protability drop, and a longer stay in economic downturns all
indicate large debt servicing costs, leading to pervasively conservative debt policy across the
whole business cycle. These ndings provides new insights on the pro-cyclical debt policy in
nancially constrained rms Korajczyk and Levy (2003), and Covas and Den Haan (2011)
, debt conservatism (Graham 2000), and puzzling negative correlation between protability
and leverage ratios (Frank and Goyal 2008).
My study provides several fruitful opportunities for future research. The endogenous
determination of risk premium is an important topic. Counter-cyclical credit spread varia-
tions are widely recognized in empirical studies but largely unexamined in this study. The
examination of an individual rms market timing aspect is another direction. I mainly con-
sider stochastic variation of external nancing conditions according to the business cyclical
states. Yet, my model does not incorporate potential market timing opportunities relying
on an individual rms valuation. The combinational e¤ects of macroeconomic and individ-
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A.1 Data Description: Structural Estimation
Table A.1.1: Denition of Variables used in the SMM estimation
Variable Denition
Investment (Capital Expenditures (CAPX)   Sale of Property, Plant and Equipment
(SPPE) +Acquisitions (AQC))/Property, Plant and Equipment   Total
(GROSS, PPEGT)
Leverage Long-Term Debt   Total (DLTT)/ (Assets - Total (AT)   Cash and Short-
Term Investments (CHE))
Cash Cash and Short  Term Investments (CHE) / (Assets - Total (AT)   Cash and
Short-Term Investments (CHE))
Dividends(Equity) (Cash Dividends (DV) + Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock(PRSTKC)
  Sale of Common and Preferred Stock (SSTK)) / (Assets - Total (AT)  Cash
and Short-Term Investments (CHE))
Tobins Q (End of year price (PRCC_F)  Number of Common Shares Outstanding
(CSHO) + Long-Term Debt - Total (DLTT)   Cash and Short-Term Invest-
ments (CHE)) /Property, Plant and Equipment - Total (GROSS, PPEGT)
Operating Prot Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) /
(Assets - Total (AT)   Cash and Short-Term Investments (CHE))
The table A.1.1 reports the denition of real and nancial variables from the CRSP/Compustat
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database. The symbols in parenthesis refer to the items in CRSP/Compustat merged data-
base.
The business cyclical categorization in Chapter 3 is based on US Business Cycle Expan-
sions and Contractions.
A.2 Data Description: Cross-sectional Analysis
I introduce several control variables for empirical analyses on capital structure choices, as
proposed in Frank and Goyal (2008). Some variables are redened by following prior litera-
ture. Table A.1.2 reports the detailed variable constructions.
Table A.2.1: Denition of Variables used in the Empirical Analyses
Variable Denition
Asset (Deated) Assets - Total (AT)
Protability Earnings Before Interest (EBITDA) / Assets - Total (AT)
Tangibility Property, Plant and Equipment - Total (Net, PPENT)/ Assets - Total (AT)
R&D expenditure Research and Development Expense (XRD)/ Assets - Total (AT)
Market to Book (End of year price (PRCC_F)Number of Common Shares Outstanding
(CSHO) + Long-Term Debt - Total (DLTT))/Assets - Total (AT)
Investment (Capital Expenditures (CAPX)-Sale of Property, Plant and Equipment (SPPE)
+ Research and Development Expense (XRD)/)/ Assets - Total (AT)
Tobins Q (End of year price (PRCC_F)Number of Common Shares Outstanding
(CSHO)+ Long-Term Debt - Total (DLTT)Cash and Short-Term Investments
(CHE)) /Assets - Total (AT)
Leverage Long-Term Debt - Total (DLTT)/ Assets - Total (AT)
Cash Cash and Short-Term Investments (CHE) /Assets - Total (AT)
Equity Financing (Cash Dividends (DV) + Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock(PRSTKC)




B.1 Numerical Solutions: Chapter 1
To achieve a numerical solution of model, I use the value function iteration method, which
requires to discretize state spaces for the four state variables. The state variable constructions
are very similar to Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), and DDW. The space of capital stock
lies on the following points:
[k(1  )20; :::; k(1  )1=2; k]:
The boundness of k for a decreasing returns to scale prot function ; is discussed in Hennessy
and Whited (2005).
The protability shock (z) is modelled to have 12 points. I transform AR(1) process into
a discrete state Markov chain on the interval of [ 4; 4]. Tauchen (1986) argues that 8~9












; the same as in DDW. I let the debt (b) state have equally spaced 25
points in the interval of [0;b] and the cash (b) state have equally spaced 12 points in the
interval of [0; c]:1
B.2 Numerical Solutions: Chapter 3
To achieve a numerical solution of model, I use the value function iteration method, which
requires to discretize state spaces for the four state variables. The state variable constructions
are very similar to Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), and DDW. The space of capital stock
lies on the following points:
[k(1  )20; :::; k(1  )1=2; k]:
The boundness of k for a decreasing returns to scale prot function ; is discussed in Hennessy
and Whited (2005).
The individual protability shock (z) is modelled to have 8 points. I transform AR(1)
process into a discrete state Markov chain on the interval of [ 4; 4]. Tauchen (1986) argues
that 8~9 points are enough to approximate the AR(1) process. There are two macroeconomic
states zh and zl as well with the transition probability dened in the main body. The upper




is obtained if I assume the upper bound for cash balance(c) is






; the same as in DDW. I let the debt (b)
state have equally spaced 25 points in the interval of [0;b] and the cash (b) state have equally
spaced 12 points in the interval of [0; c]:




The global identication of a SMM estimator is achieved if the expected value of the di¤er-
ence between the simulated moments and the data moments equals zero if and only if the
structural parameters equal their true values. To correctly identify structural parameters, I
pick up the following 13 moments; these moments consist of the rst and second moments of
investment and operating prots. The autocorrelation of operating prots, and the average
dividends, and Tobins q values are also included. The average of equity nancing frequency,
cash and leverage ratios are reported according to the business cyclical variations. My iden-
tication scheme is closely associated with the identication strategy of DDW because I x
the macroeconomic transition probability and protability realizations. The average and
variance of investment help identify the capital adjustment cost parameters, k and k. A
higher convex capital adjustment cost decreases the average and variance of investment and
a higher xed capital adjustment cost raises the variance of investment. Average operat-
ing prots helps to identity the curvature of prot function, a and the xed operating cost
parameter, : A higher  raises average prot (zk   kss=k) and a higher xed operating
cost parameter,  lowers average operating prots. The serial correlation of the protability
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shock, ; and the xed operating parameter, ; a¤ects the serial correlations in operating
prots. A higher xed operating cost increases the correlations in prot generation. The
variance of prot helps capture the uncertainty parameter of prot evolution, . The average
dividends and Tobins q are closely associated with a rm valuation.
The other moment selections pertain to a rms nancing decision. The frequency of
equity nancing over the macroeconomic states help the identication of time-varying equity
nancing costs, h and l. The leverage ratios in economic upturns and downturns help pin
down the baseline debt nancing cost,  and the additional nancing cost component, :
A large  decreases leverage ratios in economic downturn more substantially due to the
lower interest tax shields in economic downturns. A large  conversely provides substantial
incentives to maintain higher leverage ratios in economic downturns. The business cyclical
variations of cash holding also assist the identication of two debt nancing cost parameters
by a similar reasoning.
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